Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic Baselines in the Administrative State by Salzman, James & Ruhl, J.B.
1b. Ruhl-Salzman_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/24/2011 2:28 PM 
 
1 
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
VOLUME 64 JANUARY 2011 NUMBER 1  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Gaming the Past: The Theory and 
Practice of Historic Baselines in the 
Administrative State 
J.B. Ruhl* & James Salzman** 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 2 
I.     WHAT ARE HISTORIC BASELINES? ......................................... 10 
A.   Attributes ................................................................... 11 
B.   Design Choices ........................................................... 13 
1.  Ancient Versus Recent Baselines ................... 13 
2.  Specific Date Versus Percentage Target ........ 15 
3.  Static Versus Fluid ......................................... 16 
II.    WHY HISTORIC BASELINES? .................................................. 18 
A.  Why Use Historic Baselines? ..................................... 18 
1. If the Shoe Fits . . . . ....................................... 18 
2.  Understandability .......................................... 19 
3.  Return to Eden ............................................... 20 
4.  Managing Uncertainty ................................... 23 
5.  Halting Degradation ....................................... 24 
 
 * Matthews & Hawkins Professor of Property, Florida State University College of Law. 
 ** Samuel F. Mordecai Professor of Law, Nicholas Institute Professor of Environmental 
Policy, Duke University. We are thankful for the brainstorming of Don Elliott, for comments 
from Rob Glicksman, Jamie Colburn, and John Nagle, to participants in workshops at the FSU, 
Duke, Georgetown, Arizona, and Colorado law schools for their helpful comments, to our 
research assistants Abigail Dean, Andrew Hoek, James Michaels, Ben Jacobs, and to the FSU 
and Duke law schools for financial and other support. Please direct any questions or comments to 
jruhl@law.fsu.edu or salzman@law.duke.edu. 
1b. Ruhl-Salzman_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/24/2011 2:28 PM 
2 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1:1 
6.  Managing Regulated Party Strategic 
Behavior .......................................................... 24 
B.  The Disadvantages of Historic Baselines .................. 25 
1.  If the Shoe Doesn’t Fit . . . ............................. 25 
2.  Inadequate Knowledge ................................... 26 
3.  Arbitrary Nature and Lack of 
Transparency .................................................. 27 
III.   GAMING HISTORIC BASELINES ............................................... 28 
A.   The History of the “No Net Loss” Wetlands Loss 
Policy .......................................................................... 29 
B.   The Strategy of Gaming Historic Baselines .............. 36 
1.   Gaming the Temporal Reference Point .......... 36 
a.  No Net Loss, After Losing 100 
Million Acres ........................................ 36 
b.  The Kyoto Protocol and the  
Magic of 1990 ...................................... 37 
c.  Salmon and the Endangered  
Species Act ........................................... 38 
2.   Gaming the Baseline Metrics ......................... 40 
3.   Gaming the Margin of Deviation ................... 41 
a.  Grandfathering Under the Clean  
Air Act .................................................. 42 
b.  The Clean Air Act and Dirty Old 
Cars...................................................... 43 
c.  The Wilderness Act .............................. 44 
C.  Is Gaming Good or Bad? ........................................... 44 
IV.   HISTORIC BASELINES AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY ........... 46 
A.  Climate Change Mitigation—Turning Back the 
Clock .......................................................................... 46 
B.   Adaptation Policy—Hitting the Reset Button ............ 49 
C.  Going Forward ........................................................... 55 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 56 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1988, candidate George H. W. Bush was in a tight race for 
the presidency, behind in the polls to the Democratic challenger, 
Michael Dukakis. Stung by the D+ grade given by the League of 
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Conservation Voters, Bush was searching for a way to claw back some 
of the environmental vote.1 He saw an opening in wetlands. 
Perceived as worthless swamps and wasted development 
opportunities for most of our nation’s history,2 conversion of wetlands 
for agricultural and urban land uses has resulted in a staggering loss 
of resources.3 Beginning in the 1970s, however, views started to 
change, with growing recognition of the valuable services wetlands 
provide to human populations—from flood protection and groundwater 
recharge to wildlife habitat.4 As a result, wetlands loss has 
increasingly been denounced as the result of paving “paradise [to] put 
up a parking lot.”5 
Well aware of this widespread concern, Bush announced in a 
major policy statement a national goal of “no net loss” of our nation’s 
wetlands.6 This proved effective on the campaign trail, and, as 
President a year later, he adopted the goal as official government 
policy.7 The Clinton Administration adopted this goal as well, going 
 
1. CRAIG PITTMAN & MATTHEW WAITE, PAVING PARADISE: FLORIDA’S VANISHING WETLANDS 
AND THE FAILURE OF NO NET LOSS 90 (2009). 
 2. See John Copeland Nagle, From Swamp Drainage to Wetlands Regulation to Ecological 
Nuisances to Environmental Ethics, 58 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 787, 789–96 (2008) (reviewing the 
history of government programs to drain and fill wetlands and of the courts’ low regard for 
swamps). 
 3. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has estimated that the contiguous forty-eight states 
lost over half their wetlands land cover from the time of European settlement until the 1990s, 
going from over 220 million acres to 107 million acres. JEFFREY ZINN & CLAUDIA COPELAND, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WETLANDS: AN OVERVIEW OF ISSUES 5 (2006). Conversion 
to agriculture accounts for over eighty percent of those losses, but in the past several decades 
loss to urbanization has taken over as the leading cause of wetland resource losses. T.E. DAHL, 
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN THE COTERMINOUS 
UNITED STATES 1998–2004, at 47 (2006) [hereinafter STATUS AND TRENDS]; ZINN & COPELAND, 
supra, at 14. Even during the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, national wetland 
losses exceeded 450,000 acres annually. DAHL, supra, at 15. 
 4. See Brant Keller, What We Always Knew: Wetlands Win Hands Down at Pollution 
Mitigation, NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSL., Sept.–Oct. 2005, at 12, 12; Sandra Postel & Stephen 
Carpenter, Freshwater Ecosystem Services, in NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON 
NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 195, 196 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997). As Hurricane Katrina made all too 
evident, cumulative wetland loss along the Gulf coast degraded these services and led to loss of 
life and property. See AFTER THE STORM: RESTORING AMERICA’S GULF COAST WETLANDS, A 
SPECIAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WETLANDS NEWSLETTER 1 (Gwen Arnold ed., 2006). Not 
surprisingly, the most economically destructive flooding in New Orleans was on prior coastal 
wetland areas that had been drained and developed. See Nature Destroys, But It Also Can 
Protect, ENVTL. F., Sept.–Oct. 2005, at 18, 18. 
 5. JONI MITCHELL, Big Yellow Taxi, on LADIES OF THE CANYON (Reprise 1970). 
 6. The political origins of the “no net loss” policy are meticulously detailed in PITTMAN & 
WAITE, supra note 1, at 90–95. For more detail, see infra Part III.A. 
 7. See, e.g., Memorandums of Agreement (MOA); Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1); 
Corrections, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210, 9210 (Mar. 12, 1990) (“The Domestic Policy Council, through its 
Inter-Agency Task Force on Wetlands, of which both the Environmental Protection Agency and 
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one step further by announcing a policy to achieve net increases in 
wetlands of 100,000 acres per year by 2005.8 In 2004, President 
George W. Bush set an even more challenging goal of a net increase of 
more than three million acres in five years.9 The “no net loss” policy, 
with its various “net gain” additions, lived on in roughly the same 
form through four very different administrations, and remains intact 
in the Obama Administration.10 
This story provides a nice case study of clever campaigning, but 
it raises an interesting question as well: Why has every president 
since 1988 framed the wetlands policy goal this way? 
After all, when announcing the policy in 1988 Bush could just 
as easily have named other goals for wetlands with equally bold 
declarations. He might have called for conserving an absolute number 
of acres (“By the end of my first term, we will have 100 million acres of 
wetlands conserved.”), protecting the most important wetlands for 
flood control (“At-risk cities such as New Orleans will remain 
protected by their natural buffers.”), or some type of cost-benefit 
assessment of which wetlands to protect (“When development is most 
important then we will allow construction, and when conservation 
 
the Army Corps of Engineers are members, has been tasked by the President to develop 
recommendations regarding attainment of the goal of no net loss of the Nation’s wetlands.”). The 
original imprimatur of the “no net loss” policy is usually traced to a policy document the 
Environmental Protection Agency and Army Corps of Engineers issued in 1990. See 
Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of the Army and the Environmental 
Protection Agency Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act 
Section 404(B)(1) Guidelines, reprinted at 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (Mar. 12, 1990) [hereinafter 1990 
Memorandum of Agreement], available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/ 
mitigate.cfm. 
 8. The specific proposal was included in the Clinton Administration’s 1998 Clean Water 
Action Plan, which included “[a] coordinated strategy to achieve a net increase of 100,000 
wetland acres a year by 2005, including a 50 percent increase in wetlands restored and enhanced 
by the Corps of Engineers.” Press Release, EPA, Clean Water Action Plan (Feb. 19, 1998), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/cwa/03.htm. Notably, no net gains were intended 
or expected to be achieved until 2005, that is, not during any Clinton Administration. See 
PITTMAN & WAITE, supra note 1, at 98. 
 9. Press Release, White House, President Announces Wetlands Initiative on Earth Day 
(Apr. 22, 2004), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/04/ 
20040422-4.html. President Bush declared: 
I’m committing our government to a new policy. We will move beyond the no net loss 
of wetlands in America to having an overall increase of Americans’ wetlands over the 
next five years. . . . We can achieve this goal . . . . To do so, we will work to restore and 
to improve and to protect at least three million acres of wetlands over the next five 
years. First, we will restore at least . . . one million acres of wetlands that do not exist 
today. 
Id. 
 10. See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 
19,594 (Apr. 10, 2008) (describing “no net loss” of wetlands as a longstanding national goal 
guiding federal policy). 
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matters most the wetlands will be protected.”). Despite these options, 
and each has its own particular merits, the “no net loss” goal, now in 
its third decade, remains firmly in place. 
The goal of “no net loss” provides an example of a “historic 
baseline.” Policymakers identify some point in the past (even the very 
recent past) whose conditions seem desirable today and going forward, 
and use that baseline to ground the policy goal. Historic baselines 
occur in a range of settings throughout regulatory law. For example: 
The U.S. Census serves as a rolling population distribution 
baseline for purposes of federal legislative allotments as well as 
the distribution baseline for many other federal benefits.11 
The Kyoto Protocol for reductions of greenhouse gas emissions 
uses 1990 as the baseline for its targets.12 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are largely based on 
averages of historic sentencing practices.13 
Wildlife refuge managers are committed to managing ecosystem 
resources based on “historic conditions.”14 
Historic baselines seem to work well in these settings and are 
used to frame policy standards across the government, from 
determining the number of federal judges15 and the bandwidth law 
enforcement agencies can use for electronic surveillance16 to tax 
reform,17 immigration quotas,18 and government budgets.19 But here is 
 
 11. See About Us, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/aboutus/ (last visited Nov. 
4, 2010). 
 12. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3, 
para. 1, opened for signature Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, available at 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php. 
 13. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon 
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 17 (1988). But see Marc Miller & Robert Wright, Your 
Cheatin’ Heart(Land): The Long Search For Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 723, 754–55 (1999) (arguing that the Guidelines were based on a more complex set of 
factors). 
 14. See Policy on Maintaining the Biological Integrity, Diversity, and Environmental 
Health of the National Wildlife Refuge System, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,810, 3,818, 3,821 (Jan. 16, 2001). 
 15. The judicial council considers requests for adding judges to federal appellate circuits by 
comparing the court’s current caseload (measured by adjusted filings) to the “reasonable” 
historical baseline of 500 adjusted filings per panel. See S. REP. NO. 110-427, at 8 (2008). 
 16. Law enforcement agencies can only seek a certain bandwidth capacity for electronic 
surveillance, and the amount they are able to seek is set by the historical baseline of capacity 
used. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-863, at 22 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
 17. In 1986, 2005, and 2009, the tax reform process was bounded by policy that had 
been set forth from above. In 2005, President Bush directed that the reform 
committee consider various alternatives (income tax, consumption tax, hybrid 
systems, etc.) but that the relative mix of tax burdens among each quintile remain the 
same. The distributive burden as of 2004 was thus used as the historic baseline. The 
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the key question: Why use historic baselines to frame the standard? 
After all, when deciding whether to conserve wetlands, reduce 
pollution, or pursue policy goals in many other settings, policymakers 
face a choice. They know where they want to go, but there are several 
routes they might take to get there. There is any number of ways to 
use regulation to move parties from A to Z but, so long as the 
regulated party ends up at Z, does it really matter how it got there? 
Put simply, in the regulatory context, how does form influence 
function? 
Consider, for example, the regulation of a hazardous air 
pollutant. Congress might pass a statute calling for a seven percent 
reduction of Dimethyl Terrible below 1990 emission levels by the year 
2020. This would be the historic baseline approach. But the policy 
could rely equally well on a range of different approaches: 
 
Standard Setting Approach Expression of Standard 
Absolute target: Specify a quantitative 
limit 
The United States will emit no more than 
200 tons in the year 2020. 
Risk-based: Specify acceptable risk levels  Emissions will be set at levels that 
protect the public health. 
Technology-based: Specify required 
technological effort  
Emissions will be set at levels achievable 
using best available technology. 
Cost-based: Specify desired cost-benefit 
outcome 
Emissions will be based at the 
economically efficient level, where 
benefits most exceed costs. 
 
idea was that by removing the political question of how to distribute the tax burden 
among rich, middle, and poor, the committee could focus on efficiency and 
administrability. Cynics noted that the baseline included Bush’s recently enacted 
cuts, which were themselves a departure from historic baselines. 
E-mail from Victor Fleischer, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law, to Jim 
Salzman, Samuel F. Mordecai Professor of Law, Nicholas Inst. Professor of Envtl. Pol’y, Duke 
Univ. (Feb. 13, 2010, 3:11 P.M.) (on file with Vanderbilt Law Review). 
 18. The Immigration Act of 1924 limited the number of immigrants to two percent of the 
number of people from that country already living in the United States in 1890. Office of the 
Historian, Milestones: 1921–1936: The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act), U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/ImmigrationAct (last visited Nov. 
4, 2010). This effectively ensured that roughly seventy-five percent of future immigration would 
come from Northwestern Europe. Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1945–1952: The 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (The McCarran-Walter Act), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/ImmigrationAct (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 19. The Congressional Budget Office baseline measures approximately what the federal 
budget would be for the next ten years if all of the current policies and laws remained in effect. 
BILL HENIFF JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV. NO. IB10096, CRS BRIEF FOR CONGRESS: 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACTIONS IN 2002, at 4, 7 (2002), available at http://www. 
policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/776.pdf. 
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Congress needs to settle on only one of these options. But how 
should it make this decision? In particular, if all of these different 
approaches yielded the same absolute levels of emissions, on what 
basis should Congress decide which approach to take, and would it 
even matter? 
A great deal of scholarship exists on the theory and practice of 
absolute, risk-based, technology-based, and cost-based methods of 
defining regulatory standards, but that is not true of the historic 
baseline method. To be sure, historic baselines receive plenty of 
scholarly attention in other settings. The doctrine of stare decisis and 
the evolution of the common law are both premised on a notion of 
respect for the baseline of past decisions. So, too, in constitutional law 
does the interpretive theory of Originalism seek to determine and hew 
to the historic baseline meaning of constitutional text.20 In the field of 
regulation, by contrast, we have found no systematic treatment of the 
theory and practice of historic baselines as a specific strategy of policy 
development. 
One might ask, so what? Why can one not simply apply what is 
known about the other approaches to historic baselines? This Article 
addresses those questions directly, showing that the unique qualities 
of historic baselines establish them as distinct instruments in 
regulatory policy warranting close attention. Unless one believes that 
policymakers choose between alternative types of goals randomly, or 
that it simply does not matter which they choose, each approach 
deserves its own theoretical development in order to make better 
choices and predict the comparative potential for success and failure. 
This Article is the first to do so for historic baselines. 
Our central inquiry is to examine what makes historic 
baselines so attractive to Congress and the President in some contexts 
but not in others. Historic baselines are found in many fields, from 
budgeting and criminal sentencing to environmental protection and 
land use, yet their particular attributes—what makes them 
potentially different from other approaches—remain unexamined. We 
do not see historic baselines used everywhere, so there must be a 
converse question: How does reliance on a historic baseline introduce 
constraints that might not be present with other types of goals? Put 
another way, when are absolute target, risk-based, technology-based, 
or cost-based standards more attractive than historic baselines? 
To get at the heart of these questions, we use examples from 
wetlands policy, the Kyoto Protocol, the Endangered Species Act, 
 
 20. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of 
Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 395 (2007). 
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climate change policy, and other regulated fields to examine the 
attributes, design issues, and strategic uses and abuses of historic 
baselines. The sections that follow provide a wide-ranging analysis of 
historic baselines, identifying where they are used in the regulatory 
landscape, why they are particularly attractive or unattractive to 
policymakers, the different dimensions of such baselines and why 
these matter, different strategies to game historic baselines, and, 
taking this together, applying our insights to the emerging policy 
debate over climate change. 
Part I unpacks the structure and design of historic baselines. 
Although not always made explicit, all historic baselines consist of 
four core attributes: (1) a regulatory goal, (2) a temporal reference 
point, (3) baseline metrics, and (4) a margin of deviation. Part I 
examines how each of these attributes contributes to the effective 
framing of the baseline, identifies the design issues particular to each, 
and demonstrates the different forms historic baselines can take. 
Part II explores the attractiveness of historic baselines. It 
examines the features that make historic baselines preferable when 
compared to risk, technology, or cost-based standards, as well as what 
makes them relatively unattractive. Historic baselines surely offer 
rhetorical benefits—goals that most anyone can understand more 
readily than some measure of risk or parts per million. At the same 
time, historic baselines assume an understanding of prior conditions 
that may be unwarranted. They may also mask more than they reveal, 
creating opportunities for rent-seeking by interest groups. 
Part III explores the mechanisms of rent-seeking in more 
detail, delving into the strategic gaming possibilities created by 
historic baselines. Of course, all standard-setting approaches are 
subject to gaming, but the temporal component of historic baselines 
sets them apart from the other approaches and opens up qualitatively 
different strategic opportunities. While historic baselines may seem 
like innocuous, inert dates from the past, it turns out they are well 
suited for intense gaming in ways that favor particular political or 
economic interests, potentially diluting the effectiveness of the 
baseline while appearing to anchor and guide regulatory policy. 
Strategic framing of the unit of the baseline or the way in which 
success toward achieving the target is measured can infuse 
malleability into the baseline over the long term. 
The “no net loss” of wetlands baseline described above, for 
example, failed to specify what counts as a wetland, or even what 
counts as loss, much less how we measure these. As discussed in Part 
III, this imprecision has led to a debate ever since over the question, 
“No net less of what? Wetland acres? Wetland function?” Baselines 
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can also be used to favor particular interest groups by selecting 
reference points, conditions, or targets amenable to their 
circumstances. For example, the 1990 baseline commonly used for 
greenhouse gas reductions in the Kyoto Protocol favored Eastern 
European and former Soviet countries.21 Given the collapse of their 
economies after the fall of the Iron Curtain, this baseline amounted to 
a subsidy to encourage these countries to sign. A baseline of 1985, for 
example, would have been far less attractive. 
To be clear, our examination of gaming opportunities is not 
intended to generally praise or condemn historic baselines. In some 
contexts using historic baselines to set regulatory standards might be 
folly, and in others it might break policy logjams where no other 
approach could. Hence, while describing the attributes, design, and 
gaming of historic baselines is important for identifying how they 
operate as a distinct policy instrument, the real test for the analytical 
framework we build is whether it helps in understanding how 
policymakers might usefully employ historic baselines in current 
policy challenges. 
To this end, Part IV aims the theoretical framework we have 
developed at a practical context by examining the potential role of 
historic baselines in climate change policy. Climate change poses 
tremendous disruptions of the human and natural environments over 
the coming decades, leading to social and environmental changes of a 
character and magnitude not experienced in modern history. The 
demand for action will require policymakers to consider a wide array 
of regulatory goals for controlling greenhouse gas emissions, 
sequestering carbon from the atmosphere, and adapting to climate 
change impacts that cannot be avoided. Our analysis shows that 
historic baselines will be an essential policy instrument for designing 
approaches to limit greenhouse gas emissions and enhance carbon 
sinks, but that they will prove unworkable or even counterproductive 
in the context of climate change adaptation policy. 
Oscar Wilde wryly observed that “the one charm of the past is 
that it is the past.”22 Given the ubiquity of historic baselines in the 
administrative state, the past remains firmly in the present. Yet legal 
scholarship has not developed a sophisticated theory for the practice of 
historic baselines in the administrative state. This Article fills that 
gap by building an analytical framework for understanding how 
 
 21. David G. Victor et al., The Kyoto Protocol Emission Allocations: Windfall Surpluses for 
Russia and Ukraine, 49 CLIMATIC CHANGE 263, 263 (2001). 
 22. OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 81 (Michael Patrick Gillsepie ed., W.W. 
Norton & Co. 2d ed. 2007) (1891). 
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historic baselines are designed and strategically employed in 
regulatory policy. Given the potentially transformative effects and 
massive scales of looming regulatory problems, such as climate 
change, a deeper understanding of how historic baselines operate is 
long overdue. 
I.  WHAT ARE HISTORIC BASELINES? 
Suppose that Congress, as part of its national climate change 
policy initiative, decides that federal public lands should play a 
significant role in promoting carbon sequestration.23 Congress could 
simply specify “promoting carbon sequestration” as yet another goal 
federal land management agencies must consider in management 
decisions, or it could establish more specific targets. For example, 
Congress could direct agencies to manage timber resources to 
sequester a specified quantity of carbon each year, to give 
management preference to the tree species with the greatest 
sequestration potential, or to use cost-benefit analysis to design a new 
management regime centered on carbon sequestration. 
Assume, though, that Congress chose to use a historic baseline 
as the means of establishing the carbon sequestration management 
benchmark, much as President Bush did with wetlands. In this 
Section, we focus on how Congress and agencies would construct such 
a historic baseline. While using a point in time as a reference is a 
fundamental aspect of historic baselines, there is more to designing a 
baseline than just randomly picking a year from the past. Historic 
baselines actually have discrete qualities and specific attributes that 
 
 23. Carbon sequestration is a form of climate change mitigation that focuses on increasing 
sinks of carbon rather than reducing sources of carbon emissions. See INT’L PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WORKING GROUP III: MITIGATION, app. II, (2001) available at 
http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/?src=/climate/ipcc_tar/wg3/454.htm 
(“[Sequestration is] the process of increasing the carbon content of a carbon reservoir other than 
the atmosphere. Biological approaches to sequestration include direct removal of carbon dioxide 
from the atmosphere through land-use change, afforestation, reforestation, and practices that 
enhance soil carbon in agriculture. Physical approaches include separation and disposal of 
carbon dioxide from flue gases or from processing fossil fuels to produce hydrogen- (H2) and 
carbon dioxide-rich fractions and long-term storage underground in depleted oil and gas 
reservoirs, coal seams, and saline aquifers.”) (emphasis omitted). Federal public land 
management policy has recently turned attention to how the federal government’s vast land 
holdings could contribute to carbon sequestration through subsurface storage and through 
storage in vegetative land cover. See DEP’T OF INTERIOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS: FRAMEWORK FOR 
GEOLOGIC CARBON SEQUESTRATION ON PUBLIC LAND IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 714 OF THE 
ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY ACT 1–2 (2009), available at http://groundwork 
.iogcc.org/sites/default/files/Framework%20for%20Geological%20Storage.pdf; ROSS W. GORTE, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. NO. RL31432, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CARBON SEQUESTRATION IN 
FORESTS 3 (2007), available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets /crs/RL31432.pdf. 
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prove important in understanding their advantages and 
disadvantages compared to other types of standards. The chart below 
sets out the core attributes of historic baselines for carbon 
sequestration in national forests. These attributes and the design 
choices they provide are then explored in greater detail in the text 
that follows. 
 
Attribute Design Questions 
Regulatory goal What is the purpose of the goal in sequestering 
carbon on national forest lands? Can this be 
adequately captured by a historic baseline? 
Temporal reference 
point 
What set of conditions at a particular period in the 
past best represents these conditions on national 
forest lands? 
Baseline metrics What protocol and criteria should be used to measure 
those conditions at the temporal reference point and 
in the present and future? 
Margin of deviation What deviations from the conditions as they existed 
at the temporal reference point will be tolerated? 
A.  Attributes 
To begin with, all standards express a regulatory goal. In the 
carbon sequestration scenario, the broad goal, of course, is to 
sequester carbon in vegetation, usually forests. The very nature of the 
goal may make historic baselines more or less attractive. If the goal is 
economic efficiency or equity, then a historic baseline approach may 
not make a lot of sense—a cost-benefit goal or multiple-use mandate 
would be more appropriate.24 
An inherent feature of a historic baseline is that it does not use 
a specific quantitative standard to express the goal, such as so many 
million tons of carbon sequestered each year. Rather, a historic 
baseline implies that a point in the past can serve as the foundation 
for regulatory goals in the present and future. We may wish to 
sequester as much carbon on national forest lands each year as in 
1990, or in some other year of peak sequestration capacity. This goal 
requires the creation of a temporal reference point. 
Of course, a number of assumptions are embedded into such a 
reference point. First, historic baselines assume that an ideal 
 
 24. The Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards, for example, require the 
EPA to set standards that protect the public health within an adequate margin of safety. 42 
U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2008). 
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temporal reference point can be defined. For the wetlands “no net loss” 
baseline, that appeared easy—the temporal reference point was the 
day President Bush issued the policy in 1990. But had the goal been to 
restore wetlands to some past state of conditions, the question would 
have been which year or period in the past best matched the 
restoration goal. 
The second assumption is that we actually know the conditions 
in place at the time of the reference point. This requires that the 
baseline incorporate a set of baseline metrics that define what 
regulators believe are both the essential characteristics of the 
regulatory goal and a reliable measurement of the past condition, 
which may not be as easy as it seems. For one thing, if the conditions 
occurred in the past, was monitoring at the time adequate to measure 
the important metrics? If the wetlands policy goal had been no net loss 
from wetlands coverage in 1950, there would have been significant 
estimation concerns if data from that period were incomplete or 
sketchy. In practice, the “no net loss” policy finessed the expression of 
the temporal reference point by using the date of the policy 
announcement. This policy choice avoids the problem of accurate 
measurement of past conditions, but does not speak to the more 
difficult questions—no net loss of what? What counts as a wetland, 
and what is it about wetlands the baseline is counting? There is a 
continuing debate over what exactly should be counted today as a 
wetland for purposes of evaluating success in achieving the “no net 
loss” goal.25 Should the “no net loss” goal be considered no net loss of 
wetland services, wetland function, or wetland acreage? 
Moreover, assuming that conditions at the time of the temporal 
reference point and thereafter can be reliably described and measured, 
another assumption inherent in a historic baseline is that those 
conditions can be achieved once again and maintained in the future 
within some margin of deviation. Of course, any type of standard 
assumes the regulatory goal can be successfully attained, but historic 
baselines carry with them the fundamental reality that the past 
seldom can be perfectly recreated and maintained. The “no net loss” 
policy, for example, very pointedly did not preclude loss of any wetland 
resources. Rather, it accommodated losses by requiring that they be 
mitigated through restoration, enhancement, or preservation of other 
wetland resources to achieve no net loss.26 But does the policy allow 
net losses of one type of wetland if mitigated with restoration of 
another type of wetland? And does the policy allow net losses in one 
 
 25. See infra Part III.A. 
 26. See infra Part III.A. 
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area of a state if mitigated with restored wetlands in another part of 
the state? Depending on how these questions are decided, the actual 
wetland resources on the ground could deviate substantially from 
those present at the time the federal government adopted the policy, 
even while the “no net loss” goal is maintained in a broad sense.  
To summarize, a historic baseline has four core attributes, 
irrespective of whether it is addressing wetlands, toxic chemicals, or 
budgets. The baseline must flow from a regulatory goal and be 
anchored in a temporal reference point, measured by metrics to assess 
progress toward the reference point, and cabined within a margin of 
deviation from the reference point. Using these attributes, 
policymakers have several design choices to make. 
B.  Design Choices 
In practice, the historic baselines in our laws are shaped by 
three basic design choices: (1) whether the temporal point of reference 
is recent or ancient; (2) whether the baseline seeks to replicate 
conditions at the temporal reference date or uses the baseline 
conditions as a reference point from which to specify the regulatory 
standard; and (3) whether the baseline is static or fluid. These choices, 
in turn, are driven by the regulatory goals—different kinds of 
baselines serve different purposes. 
1. Ancient Versus Recent Baselines 
The fundamental purpose of a historic baseline is to “anchor” a 
standard using a reference point from the past. Our research revealed 
that Congress and agencies tend to do so by using either recent 
reference points or ancient reference points, with nothing in the 
middle. Ancient baselines are perhaps the most controversial examples 
of historic baselines, as they generally are associated with highly 
normative statements about humans and the environment—that both 
were somehow “better” a long, long time ago. As a result, they are also 
the most abstract form of baseline. For example, the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service (“FWS”) proposed national wildlife refuge regulations 
in 2000 to maintain the “biological integrity, diversity, and 
environmental health” of the refuges system.27 To determine what 
constitutes these three conditions, the proposed regulations adopted 
 
 27. Draft Policy on Maintaining Ecological Integrity of the National Wildlife Refuge 
System, 65 Fed. Reg. 61,356, 61,356 (Oct. 17, 2000). 
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an ancient “natural conditions” baseline standard of implementation. 
As the agency explained: 
The holistic integration of these three qualities constitutes ecological integrity. The 
concept of ecological integrity requires a frame of reference for natural conditions. Our 
frame of reference extends from 800 AD to 1800 AD. The former date marked the 
beginning of an ecological transformation associated with higher temperatures; the 
latter approximates the advent of the industrial era, including drastic and widespread 
habitat loss. In areas where pre-industrial European settlement was particularly 
intensive, however, our frame of reference may be shorter. Natural conditions also 
include those that would have persisted or evolved to the present time if European 
settlement and industrialization had not occurred. At each refuge, we ascertain natural 
conditions, assess current conditions, and strive to decrease the difference.28 
This kind of historic baseline has a clear goal and temporal 
reference point. Underlying these, however, are unstated assumptions 
that (1) the period from 800–1800 AD best defines natural conditions; 
(2) the agency can employ a set of metrics that reliably measures 
conditions of a particular refuge area in that period and compares 
them to conditions of the refuge in the present; and (3) the difference 
between then and now could be reduced to some acceptable margin of 
deviation. 
Each of those assumptions is problematic, however, which 
helps explain why they were unstated. Indeed, in its final 
promulgation of the rule, the FWS reported that “this concept clearly 
created a catalyst for controversy among reviewers,” with the “great 
majority express[ing] strong concern.”29 The agency attempted to 
address the concerns by being more straightforward, replacing 
“natural conditions” with the concept of “historic conditions,” which 
the agency described as “composition, structure, and functioning of 
ecosystems resulting from natural processes that we believe, based on 
sound professional judgment, were present prior to substantial human 
related changes to the landscape.”30 Hence, while backing off the full 
implications of “natural conditions,” the FWS stuck to the position 
that “a reference point is pivotal to compliance with the mandate [to] . 
. . ensure the maintenance of biological diversity, integrity, and 
environmental health.”31 The essence of this and other ancient 
baselines, therefore, is to differentiate between modern conditions and 
conditions from the distant and possibly even prehistoric past, in this 
case between ecological conditions before and after significant human-
 
 28. Id. at 61,359–60 (emphasis added). 
 29. Policy on Maintaining the Biological Integrity, Diversity, and Environmental Health of 
the National Wildlife Refuge System, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,810, 3,811 (Jan. 16, 2001). 
 30. Id. at 3,818. 
 31. Id. at 3,811. 
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induced change, in order to define a pre-human environmental 
baseline. 
Most historic baselines ground the temporal reference point in 
the recent past. The “no net loss” standard and rolling budget 
baselines are obvious examples. Interestingly, we could find no 
example of a historic baseline using a reference point between ancient 
and recent time frames relevant to current generations of people. 
Thus, for example, no regulatory baseline in effect today references 
“1910” or “pre-World War I.” Even the baselines discussed in the 
context of climate change, where one might reasonably expect the 
goals to reference a time before industrial greenhouse gas emissions 
began to have effects on the climate system, fit the pattern through 
the convoluted route of basing reductions off of recent temporal 
reference points. In July 2009, for example, the G8 nations supported 
a target to keep global temperatures from rising more than two 
degrees Celsius from current levels.32 A year earlier, the same group of 
leaders had called for halving greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.33 
This goal could have been framed much more directly as reductions 
that meet a baseline year of, say, 1900. As discussed in Part II, the 
reason for using this approach likely turns on the framing effect of 
recency—that is, that people living today can relate to 1990 as a 
reference point for additional reductions, whereas a baseline of 1900 
would not resonate even though the two may be identical in terms of 
emissions levels. 
2. Specific Date Versus Percentage Target 
While a historic baseline must fix a temporal reference point, 
not all baselines stop there. Indeed, many historic baselines, 
particularly in the pollution context, use the baseline date as the 
fulcrum upon which percentage targets pivot. Thus the Kyoto Protocol 
mandates that the United States reduce its greenhouse gas emissions 
by 2012 to seven percent below the 1990 levels, while Australia is 
allowed to increase its emissions eight percent above 1990 levels by 
2012. The National Wildlife Refuge regulations’ “historic conditions” 
baseline described above, by contrast, is fixed. The FWS is not trying 
to achieve eighty percent of historic conditions. In general, these fixed 
baselines operate in the first instance as qualitative goals, such as the 
 
 32. Patrick Wintour & Larry Elliott, G8 Agrees to Climate Targets Despite Differences with 
Developing Nations, GUARDIAN (London), July 8, 2009, at 14, available at http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/08/g8-climate-carbon-emission-targets. 
 33. G8 Adopts Climate Change Goal for 2050, BRIDGES TRADE BIORES, July 11, 2008, at 6, 
available at http://ictsd.org/i/news/biores/12755/. 
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wetlands “no net loss” policy. The agency must then determine the 
appropriate baseline metrics and margin of deviation to make this 
work in practice. 
So why prefer a specific date versus a percentage target? As 
noted above, fixed dates work well when there are not good data about 
the actual baseline date and the year serves as a proxy for a 
qualitative state (for example, 1492 instead of pre-European 
colonization). The “fulcrum” approach of percentage targets, by 
contrast, allows a wide range of flexibility for goals that are quite 
independent of the actual baseline conditions (for example, sixty, 
eighty, or ninety-five percent of 1990 levels). Also, the percentage 
approach allows policymakers to select a date that fits in the recent 
past for purposes of providing a temporal reference point that 
resonates in the public mind and memory, but then use the percentage 
target to define the actual standard. As noted, for example, many of 
the greenhouse gas emission reduction targets use 1990 as the 
reference point and a percentage target to set a final emissions level. 
If, by contrast, the target for a national aggregate emissions level was 
keyed to the year in which the nation last met that level, the temporal 
reference point would be 1910, and if per capita emissions were the 
metric the temporal reference point would be 1875.34 It is worth 
noting, as well, that baselines also imply deadlines. Meeting a 1990 
emissions deadline is much harder in 2012 than in 2050. Therefore, 
the timing of the deadline plays a fundamental role in baseline design. 
3. Static Versus Fluid 
The final design choice turns on whether the baseline is fixed 
in time or explicitly designed to change over time. A historic baseline 
can be made fluid through mechanisms such as rolling period 
averages or periodic adjustment using specified standards. To 
expressly recognize new knowledge and more precise measurement 
techniques, for example, the baseline could ratchet up every ten years. 
In principle, this approach builds flexibility into the baseline to 
accommodate changes in conditions. As a result, rolling baselines can 
have a longer life, making them both anchored and adaptive. This 
flexibility provides an effective way to keep the standard moving. 
These baselines generally start with a specific benchmark 
period, but then move over time to reflect what might be natural 
 
 34. Steven F. Hayward & Kenneth P. Green, Waxman-Markey: An Exercise in Unreality, 
ENERGY & ENV’T. OUTLOOK (Am. Ent. Inst. Pub. Pol’y Research, Washington, D.C.), July 2009, at 
1, 3–4, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/EEO-03-July-09-g.pdf. 
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variability in conditions, budget levels, or changes in knowledge about 
whatever is being measured. A number of river management 
baselines, for example, account for variations in wet and dry years by 
using flow data averaged over rolling periods of consecutive years,35 
and the federal budgeting process has used a rolling baseline to 
estimate federal spending and receipts during a fiscal year under 
existing policies.36 
Using the carbon sequestration scenario described at the 
beginning of Part I as an example, the baseline attributes and types 
outlined above can be meaningfully summarized in the chart below: 
 
 Design Choice 
Attribute Ancient versus recent  Fixed versus percentage 
benchmark 
Static versus fluid 
 
Regulatory 
goal 
Manage national forests 
to achieve sequestration 
levels under “natural 
conditions” versus under 
conditions taking human 
presence into account 
Manage national forests 
based on carbon 
sequestration conditions 
that existed at the 
reference point versus 
some percentage thereof 
Manage each national 
forest to achieve and 
maintain its maximum 
past sequestration 
capacity versus allowing 
the level to change over 
time  
Temporal 
reference 
point 
Use a period of pre-
European settlement or 
pre-human settlement 
versus a more recent date, 
such as 1995 
Use the reference point 
as the level versus as 
the fulcrum from which 
to set percentage goals 
Stick with the original 
reference point versus 
allow it to adjust under 
some formula, such as a 
rolling ten-year average 
Baseline 
metrics 
Likely the same under 
either approach, though 
metrics for recent 
reference points may 
allow more precise 
measurement 
Likely the same under 
either approach 
Likely the same under 
either approach 
Margin of 
deviation 
Likely higher for ancient 
baselines given the 
impossibility of 
replicating pre-European 
or pre-human conditions 
Possibly high depending 
on how different year X 
is from present 
Possibly high depending 
on how different year X 
is from present 
 
 35. Monitoring and Data on Minnesota’s Rivers, MINN. SHORELINE MGMT. RESOURCE 
GUIDE, http://www.d.umn.edu/~seawww/depth/rivers/24.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 36. See BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV. NO. 98-560 GOV, CRS REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS: BASELINES AND SCOREKEEPING IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 1–2 (rev. Dec. 8, 
2006), available at http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/98-560.pdf (“Discretionary spending is 
assumed to continue at the level of the current year’s spending level adjusted ‘sequentially and 
cumulatively’ for inflation and other factors.”). 
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II.  WHY HISTORIC BASELINES? 
Assume, for a moment, that you are the legislative aide to the 
ranking Senator in the Committee on Environment and Public Works. 
You have been asked to draft a bill to reduce a particular pollutant. 
You know where you want to end up—reduce the twenty tons emitted 
today to fifteen tons of total emissions in 2012. Sitting down to 
translate the idea into statutory text, though, you realize that you can 
end up at fifteen tons using any number of goals. You wonder to 
yourself, “If the final endpoint is fifteen tons, does it really matter 
whether I use an absolute goal, a 25 percent reduction from the 
current level of twenty tons, a risk-based approach, or the best 
available technology? So long as the legislation gets the regulated 
community to the same final number, who cares how they get there?” 
You would also face very similar questions if you were conserving a 
natural resource, such as wetlands or forest cover. 
In this thought experiment, why would you favor one type of 
goal over another? Surprisingly, in our discussions with legislative 
aides working in Congress, this type of explicit deliberation among 
types of goals rarely seems to take place, hence the reason for writing 
this Article. Make no mistake, though; an implicit calculation does 
occur. If all that mattered were the final number, then one might 
expect a random distribution of statutory goal types. Therefore, in 
practice, some types of goals must prove more suitable in particular 
circumstances than others. This Section explores why the form of the 
statutory goal makes a functional difference. In particular, it breaks 
out the likely benefits and disadvantages of using historic baselines to 
express statutory goals. As this Section will show, more generally the 
type of goal illuminates certain comparisons by suppressing others. 
A. Why Use Historic Baselines? 
1. If the Shoe Fits . . . . 
The most obvious reason to choose a historic baseline as the 
statutory goal is that there is no choice but to do so. If the express goal 
is a qualitative state from the past, there is no obvious number to set. 
As described above, for example, the FWS strives to manage the 
nation’s wildlife refuges toward a baseline of “historic conditions.” 
This baseline does not lend itself to precise numbers of species 
assemblage or population numbers, at least not at the statutory level. 
There is no other way to manage for historic conditions than to use a 
historic baseline. Pointed toward the historical period, the agency, 
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whether the FWS or the Park Service, then can play its expert role to 
track disturbances and ecological succession back in time and figure 
out as best it can what the ecosystem looked like prior to 1492. 
2. Understandability 
Compared to other types of goals, historic baselines can be 
rhetorically effective. They offer a certain homespun 
understandability. The public gets the idea of returning Wildlife 
Refuges or National Parks to their state prior to European 
colonization. There is a “bumper-sticker appeal” to the phrase, “Save 
Our Wilderness.” The implicit idea behind any historic baseline is that 
we (or at least our forebears) were there once before and, most 
important, can get there again. Historic baselines draw a line in the 
sand, but a line that everyone can understand and, more important, 
relate to. They reassure both those who seek increased environmental 
protection (that progress is being made) and those who seek 
reassurance from change (that the world as they know it is not being 
destroyed). The result is incremental change anchored in a known 
state. 
Contrast, for example, the goal of returning carbon dioxide to 
pre-industrial levels with the goal of returning carbon dioxide 
concentrations to a level of 280 parts per million (“ppm”). In practical 
terms, these goals are saying the same thing but do so to very 
different effect. As Don Elliott has observed, “who will fight or 
sacrifice for 280 ppm?”37 Indeed, much of the recent greenhouse gas 
debate has turned on whether the emissions target should be twice or 
three times pre-industrial levels, presumably for this very reason. To 
take another example, when describing the acid rain trading program 
under the Clean Air Act, one can equally talk about ten million tons of 
sulfur dioxide or a fifty percent reduction from 1990 levels.38 In the 
public debate, the ten million tons figure gets much less play. 
Moreover, while undoubtedly more precise, there is an 
arbitrariness to naked numbers. Why 280 ppm instead of 290 ppm? 
No one asks this type of question about pre-industrial America. The 
 
 37. Telephone Interview with Donald Elliott, Partner at Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher and 
former General Counsel of the EPA (Oct. 7, 2009). However, the organization 350.org has been 
staging events around the globe supporting the absolute target goal of 350 ppm. See 350.ORG, 
http://www.350.org/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). Upon closer examination, however, the goal of 350 
ppm turns out to be derived from a historic baseline. See infra notes 142–43 and accompanying 
text. 
 38. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat. 2399, (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2006)). 
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meaning of that baseline, at least upon first glance, seems self-
evident, certainly compared to an absolute concentration or risk-based 
calculation. From a political point of view, from the perspective of 
selling an idea to an electorate, this is no small matter. As a candidate 
in 1988, Bush sensed this public perception with his “no net loss” 
wetlands policy, and no president since him has dared to abandon that 
approach for an express number of acres. 
As noted earlier, baselines often are coupled with deadlines, 
and distant targets off historic baselines are politically attractive. 
Negotiating any short- or medium-term international agreements to 
reduce greenhouse gases has proven remarkably challenging. Yet the 
G8 nations had no trouble agreeing by consensus in 2008 that they 
will reduce their emissions fifty percent by 2050.39 Accountability 
helps explain the preference for historic baselines with targets far into 
the future over those with shorter-term obligations. By the time 2050 
rolls around, the G8 leaders will surely not be in office, and may not 
even be alive. 
3. Return to Eden 
Scholars of the American environmental movement have often 
noted a clear strand of rhetoric that is hostile to technological and 
industrial development.40 Whether romanticizing the noble savage of a 
simpler time or imagining a landscape untrammeled by humans, the 
message is clear: modern society has despoiled our landscape. It is no 
exaggeration to state that much environmentalist rhetoric harkens 
back to an ideal of a Golden Age. Environmental groups engaged in 
the perennial debates over drilling for oil in the Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge, for example, routinely refer to the area as America’s 
“Eden.”41 
Historian William Cronon has demonstrated this best, noting 
that many writers capitalize “Nature,” as though it exists as a formal 
Platonic norm. 
 
 39. Interestingly, they did not specify the baseline year, making the goal much more flexible 
than first appears. See Wintour & Elliott, supra note 32 (“In a fudge designed to recognise the 
difficulties different rich countries will face in meeting this target, the agreed G8 communique 
released at the L’Aquila summit set a fuzzy baseline for their 80% cut ‘of 1990 or more later 
years.’ The communique also acknowledges baselines may vary but ‘efforts must be  
comparable.’ ”). 
 40. See, e.g., Edward Abbey, THE MONKEY WRENCH GANG (1975); Roderick Nash, 
WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 222 (4th ed. 2001). 
 41. See, for example, the website on the Refuge from the group, Restoring Eden, 
http://www.restoringeden.org/campaigns/ANWR/ANWRQA. See also, e.g., YELLOWSTONE: 
AMERICA’S EDEN (Scandinature Films 1997). 
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[A] great many environmental controversies revolve around . . . . “Edenic narratives,” in 
which an original pristine nature is lost through some culpable human act that results 
in environmental degradation and moral jeopardy. The tale may be one of paradise lost 
or paradise regained, but the role of the narrative is always to project onto actual 
physical nature one of the most powerful and value-laden fables in the Western 
intellectual tradition. The myth of Eden describes a perfect landscape, a place so benign 
and beautiful and good that the imperative to preserve or restore it could be questioned 
only by those who ally themselves with evil. Nature as Eden encourages us to celebrate 
a particular landscape as the ultimate garden of the world.42 
Hence the common desire to turn back the clock and restore 
some public lands to a “natural state” implicitly defined the 
environment before Europeans. The unstated premise is that humans 
necessarily have negative effects on the environment. This logic helps 
explain the appeal of historic baselines. By analogy to a human body, 
historic baselines return things to a prior state of health. Yet there is 
a vast literature on the inherent difficulty of actually identifying a 
“natural conditions” reference point, as European colonists clearly 
transformed the environment but so, too, did Native Americans 
through hunting practices and their use of fire.43 Beavers transformed 
 
 42. UNCOMMON GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 37 (William Cronon 
ed., 1995); see also Jedediah Purdy, Politics of Nature, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1175 (2010) (noting 
that, for environmentalists, “a register of moral and aesthetic response elevated the wild and 
spectacular above the settled and mechanical, demoting the latter as ugly and uninspiring”). 
 43. John A. Stanturf et al., Fire in the Southern Forest Landscape, in DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
FOREST SERV., SOUTHERN FOREST RESOURCE ASSESSMENT 608–09 (John G. Greis & David N. 
Wear eds., 2002), available at http://www.srs.fs.usda.gov/sustain/report/pdf//chapter_25e.pdf. The 
degree to which Native Americans altered grassland ecosystems prior to European settlement is 
controversial. See CHARLES MANN, 1491: NEW REVELATIONS OF THE AMERICAS BEFORE COLUMBUS 
(2005). There is a raging debate among ecological historians as to the impact early human 
inhabitants of the continent had on the surrounding flora and fauna. In particular, they disagree as 
to causes of the rapid extinction of the rich array of megafauna that were found on the continent 
around the time the first human migrations to North America are believed to have occurred (about 
13,000 years ago). Was it the deadly Clovis point, used expertly by early native hunters, or climate 
change, or species competition, or an extraterrestrial object strike? See, e.g., Jacquelyn L. Gill et al., 
Pleistocene Megafaunal Collapse, Novel Plant Communities, and Enhanced Fire Regimes in North 
America, 326 SCIENCE 1100, 1100–03 (2009) (arguing that megafaunal decline started prior to 
human intervention and triggered fires, not the reverse); Donald K. Grayson & John Alroy, Did 
Human Hunting Cause Mass Extinction?, 294 SCIENCE 1459, 1459–62 (2001) (presenting a series of 
letters debating the question); Vance Holliday, Where Have All the Mammoth Gone?, 300 SCIENCE 
1373, 1373–74 (2003) (reviewing and questioning recent studies); Christopher Johnson, 
Megafaunal Decline and Fall, 326 SCIENCE 1072, 1072–73 (2009) (discussing different theories); 
Richard A. Kerr, Megafauna Died from Big Kill, Not Big Chill, 300 SCIENCE 885, 885 (2003) 
(discussing research suggesting that humans arrived in North America just before the time of 
the megafauna collapse, and that the collapse preceded the era of massive climate change 
beginning 10,000 years ago); Martyn Murray, Overkill and Sustainable Use, 299 SCIENCE 1851, 
1851–53 (2003) (discussing evidence of unsustainable hunting). In any event, there is little debate 
that the largest set of impacts on the Great Plains has been the post-European settlement 
introductions of widespread irrigated agriculture, intensive domestic cattle and sheep grazing, and 
concerted fire suppression. Background on the ongoing degradation of North American grasslands 
attributable to these factors is available in NAT’L BIOLOGICAL SERV., U.S. DEP’T. OF INTERIOR, OUR 
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the forests of the Northeast.44 When settling on a natural baseline, 
why privilege some particular states over others? Why define as 
optimal the carbon dioxide levels prior to the industrial age instead of 
thirty or forty years after the advent of the Industrial Revolution? 
These are valid, and difficult, questions but they are masked by 
reliance on a baselines approach. 
Part of historic baselines’ appeal also probably derives from the 
endowment effect. Clearly demonstrated in both experiments and 
everyday life, the endowment effect is a cognitive bias that values 
personal goods at a higher value than non-personal goods. The classic 
demonstration is an experiment asking subjects to identify their 
willingness to accept payment for a coffee mug they have just been 
given. Time and again, the payment they demand for the mug in hand 
proves higher than their willingness to pay for the same mug from 
someone else.45 Parting with something they own, that has somehow 
become a part of them, adds a greater value to the object. Similarly, 
historic baselines build off a part of our past, whether imagined or 
real. Either we or our ancestors lived at the time of the reference point 
and experienced those conditions. Historic baselines thus harken back 
to our past in a personal way. This approach resonates far more 
deeply, far more personally, than absolute numbers or risk-based 
goals ever could. 
Nor should this effect be surprising. There is extensive 
psychology and social science literature, and a growing focus in legal 
scholarship, on the importance of “framing effects,” which occur “when 
individuals—often reasonably sophisticated and otherwise rational 
individuals—make and frequently maintain substantively 
inconsistent choices depending upon the manner in which the choices 
 
LIVING RESOURCES 295–307 (1995), available at http://biology.usgs.gov/status_trends/ 
static_content/documents/olrdocs/Intro.pdf, and WORLD RES. INST., A GUIDE TO WORLD RESOURCES 
2000–2001: PEOPLE AND ECOSYSTEMS 119–31 (2000), available at http://pdf.wri.org/world_ 
resources_2000-2001_people_and_ecosystems.pdf. For epic accounts of the ecological history of our 
continent, including the interaction of early human inhabitants and their surroundings, see 
generally TIM FLANNERY, THE ETERNAL FRONTIER: AN ECOLOGICAL HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICA 
AND ITS PEOPLES (2001); DAVID S. WILCOVE, THE CONDOR’S SHADOW: THE LOSS AND RECOVERY OF 
WILDLIFE IN AMERICA (1999). An excellent history of the social, physical, and ecological conditions 
associated with grazing on the American rangelands is found in DEBRA L. DONAHUE, THE WESTERN 
RANGE REVISITED 1–160 (1999). 
 44. See Jamison E. Colburn, Bioregional Conservation May Mean Taking Habitat, 37 
ENVTL. L. 249, 259–60 (2007) (noting that the beaver is a species with “extraordinary ecological 
impact”). 
 45. Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase 
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1329–36 (1990). 
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are framed.”46 Experiments in the early 1980s by Amos Tversky and 
Daniel Kahneman focused on how the expression, or framing, of 
problems adopted by decisionmakers results in part from extrinsic 
manipulation of the decision options offered and in part from forces 
intrinsic to the decisionmakers, such as their norms and biases.47 
Different framings can send vastly different messages and can lead to 
different outcomes, an effect politicians have not overlooked.48 
Historic baselines offer political institutions another framing 
option for articulating policy goals in a way that conveys a different 
context to the public than the alternatives of absolute, risk-based, 
technology-based, or cost-based targets. Curiously, as noted earlier, 
historic baselines either are set in the recent past (such as 1990) or 
the ancient past (pre-industrial). We have not found any baselines in 
between, that is, between several hundred years ago and one 
generation ago. American law does not rely on baselines from 1820 or 
1930. One reason behind this pattern may be that we relate much 
more strongly to reference points drawn from our own past or from an 
imagined, Edenic past than from the years in between. Historic 
baselines are likely of greatest framing value when the policy goal can 
be expressed through an ancient or recent historic reference point. 
4. Managing Uncertainty 
Use of historic baselines also provides a useful way to set a goal 
in the face of uncertainty. Setting a greenhouse gas goal at the pre-
industrial baseline or, more realistically, at twice the pre-industrial 
baseline provides a specific target when broader policy goals, such as a 
“safe” or “optimal” level of gases, are fraught with uncertainty. 
Climate modeling is simply too imprecise to provide a single, 
generally-agreed upon number for what constitutes safe or 
economically efficient atmospheric concentrations. Reliance on a 
historic baseline, by contrast, sidesteps this technical challenge. In 
simple terms, reliance on historic baselines allows policymakers to 
 
 46. Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer 
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. TAX 
REV. 797, 798 (2005). 
 47. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453–58 (1981). 
 48. Zelinski, for example, recounts the story of the Michigan legislature, in the summer of 
2003, “decree[ing] that the state’s ‘tax expenditure’ budget shall henceforth be denoted as the 
governor’s report on ‘tax credits, deductions, and exemptions.’ ” Zelinski, supra note 46, at 798. 
Zelinski contends that “[t]his name change was not an inadvertent or technical adjustment but 
reflected a concerted effort by Michigan opponents of tax expenditure analysis to jettison what 
they believe is a misleading label.” Id. 
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start with a back-of-the-envelope estimate based on common 
understandings of a qualitative goal and then go from there. That was 
the essence of the wetlands “no net loss” policy at its origins. This 
approach masks uncertainty. 
5. Halting Degradation 
Another way that historic baselines can manage uncertainty is 
through a static or “no net loss” approach. Here the advantage is one 
of a defensive posture. Just as the Hippocratic Oath directs doctors to 
“first, do no harm,” so, too, can historic baselines fixed at the present 
or recent past serve to halt an undesirable trend. When a policymaker 
does not yet know what the “right” number is but is confident things 
are heading in the wrong direction, “no net loss” serves as an 
attractive heuristic to stop making things worse. Again, candidate 
Bush tapped into a nerve of the public consciousness with those three 
simple words. 
6. Managing Regulated Party Strategic Behavior 
Historic baselines also can serve a “hold everything” purpose as 
policymakers attempt to preclude strategic behavior of regulated 
entities in dynamic regulatory environments. As David Dana has 
identified in the land development context, for example, developers 
who believe a local jurisdiction is likely to adopt more restrictive 
regulations in the near future will engage in a “race to develop” to 
avoid the new restrictions.49 Anticipating this move, many local 
jurisdictions have countered by adopting development moratoria as 
soon as the prospect of new regulation is put on the table.50 This form 
of “no net loss” historic baseline prohibits new development pending 
the adoption of the new regulations, at which point the moratorium is 
lifted. These temporary moratoria “prevent developers and 
landowners from racing to carry out development that is destructive of 
the community’s interests before a new plan goes into effect.”51 
Recognizing these and other planning benefits, the courts generally 
have rejected the argument that such moratoria inherently constitute 
 
 49. David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race to Develop, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 
656 (1995). 
 50. See, e.g., Bradfordville Phipps Ltd. P’ship v. Leon Cnty., 804 So. 2d 464, 465–66 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (adopting a moratorium while considering zoning changes). 
 51. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 777 (9th 
Cir. 2000), aff’d 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
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temporary takings of property for which compensation must be 
provided.52 
B. The Disadvantages of Historic Baselines 
Given all the advantages of historic baselines described in the 
preceding Section, one might assume that historic baselines should 
serve as the default approach for regulatory goals. In practice, though, 
while baselines are common, they are hardly universal. Why don’t we 
see baselines everywhere? This Section explores some of the 
downsides to reliance on a historic baseline. 
1. If the Shoe Doesn’t Fit . . . . 
In contrast to when historic baselines are an obvious choice, in 
some situations they are obviously a poor choice. If there are 
overriding policy concerns about safety, cost, or risk, then historic 
baselines may prove a clumsy or ineffective goal. It is difficult to use a 
historic baseline goal that maximizes safety. If one is concerned about 
exposure to toxics such as benzene, for example, then the goal should 
be to limit exposure to benzene levels that are safe or present cancer 
risks of, say, one in one million, not a goal of reducing exposure to 
workplace levels in 1970, or even of reducing exposure by ninety 
percent compared to 1990 levels. Similarly, baseline goals do not 
account well for costs or technical feasibility (a proxy of cost). A best 
available technology standard may work much better for emissions 
than aiming for particular historic levels achieved by what surely is no 
longer the best available technology. Put simply, if concerns over 
safety, efficiency, technological adequacy, or risk are paramount, then 
baseline goals may be poor substitutes for safety-based, cost-based, or 
other types of standards. 
 
 52. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 336–
40 (2002) (rejecting the argument that a temporary moratorium is a “per se” taking of property 
under the Fifth Amendment). The Tahoe-Sierra Court left open the possibility that the 
moratorium device could be abused and thus constitute a taking. See Laurel A. Firestone, 
Comment, Temporary Moratoria And Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence After Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 277, 
287–88 (2003) (discussing the advantages of an ad hoc analysis). Some state courts have found 
moratoria to violate state constitutional protections. See, e.g., Biggers v. City of Bainbridge 
Island, 169 P.3d 14 (2007) (striking down the temporary shoreline development moratorium at 
issue and dividing on the broader question of whether a local government has authority to adopt 
a moratorium during long-term land-use planning). 
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2. Inadequate Knowledge 
Setting a historic baseline implicitly assumes we know what 
the conditions were at that point. This assumption is sometimes 
advantageous because we have more confidence about historic 
conditions than about what constitutes safe or efficient conditions. 
However, reliance on baselines can be counterproductive. This can 
occur because the wrong date is chosen or because the wrong 
assumptions are made about the past. As Randy Olsen has described 
in the context of fisheries: 
Among environmentalists, a baseline is an important reference point for measuring the 
health of ecosystems. It provides information against which to evaluate change. It’s how 
things used to be. It is the tall grass prairies filled with buffalo, the swamps of Florida 
teeming with bird life and the rivers of the Northwest packed with salmon. In an ideal 
world, the baseline for any given habitat would be what was there before humans had 
much impact. If we know the baseline for a degraded ecosystem, we can work to restore 
it. But if the baseline shifted before we really had a chance to chart it, then we can end 
up accepting a degraded state as normal—or even as an improvement. 
The number of salmon in the Pacific Northwest’s Columbia River today is twice what it 
was in the 1930s. That sounds great—if the 1930s are your baseline. But salmon in the 
Columbia River in the 1930s were only 10% of what they were in the 1800s. The 1930s 
numbers reflect a baseline that had already shifted. . . 
One of scientists’ biggest concerns is that the baselines have shifted for many ocean 
ecosystems. What this means is that people are now visiting degraded coastal 
environments and calling them beautiful, unaware of how they used to look. 
People go diving today in California kelp beds that are devoid of the large black sea 
bass, broomtailed groupers and sheephead that used to fill them. And they surface with 
big smiles on their faces because it is still a visually stunning experience to dive in a 
kelp bed. But all the veterans can think is, ‘You should have seen it in the old days.’53 
In the case of the Colorado Compact, for example, western 
states allocated Colorado River water based on the flow years of 1899-
1920.54 Each state’s allocation was an absolute amount. The problem, 
however, was that this temporal reference point represented a 
historically high period of river flow. In normal years, well before the 
clear impacts of climate change, the mean river flow was much less. 
 
 53. Randy Olson, Op-Ed., Shifting Baselines: Slow Motion Disaster in the Sea, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 17, 2002, at M2, available at www.actionbioscience.org/environment/olson.html; see also 
Thomas T. Ankersen & Kevin E. Regan, Shifting Baselines and Backsliding Benchmarks: The 
Need for a National Environmental Legacy Act to Address the Ecologies of Restoration, Resilience, 
and Reconciliation, in BEYOND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: POLICY PROPOSALS FOR A BETTER 
ENVIRONMENTAL FUTURE 53 (David M. Driesen & Alyson C. Flournoy eds., 2010) (describing the 
problems associated with shifting baselines generally). 
 54. Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Colo. River Comm’n 73 (Jan. 30, 1922), available at 
http://www.colorado.edu/colorado_river/docs/compact/meeting06.pdf. 
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As a result, lower river states locked themselves into an unfair 
allocation from the outset.55 
In these cases and others, setting the reference point assumes 
a conception of what was desirable when, in fact, the wrong period had 
been chosen. We may be identifying a past that was already terrible 
and that we do not, in fact, want to reach or, conversely, was 
unusually good and that the environment will not reach again. In this 
respect, baselines can sell themselves short. 
3. Arbitrary Nature and Lack of Transparency 
Just as absolute goals can have an arbitrary appearance, so, 
too, can historic baselines. While historic baselines may sound 
ambitious or desirable, they may not prove so at all. For example, why 
not assess how close we can get to zero deaths from typhoid, instead of 
a ninety percent reduction compared to 1930 levels? For some types of 
harms, historic baselines may not provide any useful anchoring. What 
were typhoid deaths in 1930? This date is too far back from 
contemporary reference yet not far back enough to provide a 
comprehensible qualitative goal (such as pre-industrial). 
As Leon Billings has observed, environmental policy is all 
about making practical compromises in moving toward risk-free 
goals.56 Using numeric targets and qualitative goals based on cost or 
risk make these compromises and trade-offs explicit. This is arguably 
a more honest and open approach than relying on historic baselines, 
which can hide more than they show. 
Similarly, it may be politically easier not to settle on a baseline. 
In particular, as explained below in Part III, certain dates may favor 
one interest over another. In the case of baseline years for the Kyoto 
Protocol, a date before 1990 effectively provided a subsidy for former 
Soviet countries while a later baseline would have removed this 
benefit. If a political deal could not have been reached about this 
subsidy, then a different type of goal, such as technology transfer, 
could have ensured agreement while pushing off this dispute for 
resolution at a later date. 
And baselines can be contested. Consider, for example, a 
controversy currently playing out in the Point Reyes National 
 
 55. See, e.g., The Compact and Lees Ferry, WESTERN WATER ASSESSMENT, http://wwa. 
colorado.edu/treeflow/lees/compact.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (“In other words, the Colorado 
River has been over-allocated. There is not enough water in the river, on average, to fulfill all of 
the legal entitlements.”). 
 56. Telephone Interview with Donald Elliott, Partner at Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher and 
former General Counsel of the EPA (Oct. 7, 2009). 
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Seashore, just north of San Francisco.57 The National Park Service has 
decided not to renew the permit of the Drakes Bay Oyster Company 
when it expires in 2012. Because the land is designated as “potential 
wilderness,” the Park Service has an obligation to eliminate intrusive 
commercial activity. Drakes Bay is a seventy year-old oyster farm, 
predating creation of the National Seashore. It argues that it is “part 
of the historical working landscape of the area—and every bit in need 
of protection as the harbor seals and eelgrass that share the bay.”58 Is 
the proper baseline the historic use of the area or pre-human 
history?59  
III. GAMING HISTORIC BASELINES 
We have left for its own separate consideration a critical aspect 
of historic baselines that can provide both benefit and disadvantage. 
Historic baselines can furnish significant political cover for gaming, 
hiding a wide range of decisions that provide flexibility to 
decisionmakers, either significantly softening or strengthening the 
goal. Viewed in a positive light, this cover creates space for making 
deals and, in a negative light, maximizes opportunities for rent-
seeking. In answering the question to which we keep returning—why 
would a legislator, government executive, or agency official prefer one 
type of standard over another?—a significant part of the answer lies in 
the opportunities for gaming that are particular to historic baselines, 
to which this Article now turns in Part III. 
We use the term “gaming” in a specific sense. We do not mean 
the ability to interpret language in different ways. As H.L.A. Hart 
famously showed in his example of “no vehicles in the park,” any rule 
allows for a range of interpretative meanings.60 That is inherent in the 
use of language. Rather, by gaming we mean the deliberate selection 
and design of a standard that will allow regulators significant 
flexibility to maneuver policy as desired while appearing to establish 
and abide by a seemingly inflexible standard. Gaming allows 
regulators and legislators to satisfy multiple constituencies at the 
same time by appearing to set a specific goal and then making it 
harder or easier to attain than would first appear. 
 
 57. Leslie Kaufman, Debate Flares on Limits of Nature and Commerce in Parks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, at A24. The authors thank Rob Glicksman for his assistance in identifying 
this example. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125–27 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 2d 
ed. 1994) (1961). 
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To be sure, all standards provide for a certain level of gaming. 
Our focus, though, is on whether historic baselines provide for more or 
different gaming opportunities. Framed in a practical example, this 
Section seeks to determine whether the “no net loss” wetlands historic 
baseline over the past twenty years has provided a different and, for 
the circumstances, more useful quality of policy flexibility than could 
have been achieved under alternatives such as a quantitative 
standard (conserve 100 million acres) or a qualitative standard 
(conserve the best wetlands). 
This Section draws from the practice of historic baselines to 
explore the opportunities for gaming. It starts with an in-depth case 
study of the “no net loss” wetlands policy goal. It then examines how 
each of the other three attributes identified in Part I—(1) the 
conditions at the temporal reference point; (2) the baseline metrics for 
describing the standard; and (3) the margin of deviation—was gamed 
in the “no net loss” policy. To show that the analysis is representative 
of other cases, similar examples of historic baseline gaming are also 
presented from the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Air Act, the Wilderness 
Act, and the Endangered Species Act. As detailed below, what sets 
historic baselines apart from the other types of standards is the use of 
the past to guide the future. By adopting a temporal reference point, 
historic baselines create additional flexibility for regulators to 
maneuver policy outcomes. 
A.  The History of the “No Net Loss” Wetlands Loss Policy 
As described in the Introduction, in his 1988 campaign, locked 
in a tight race for the presidency, candidate George H. W. Bush “was 
just hungry for environmental ideas.”61 Bush, an avid duck hunter, 
regretted some of his environmental responsibilities as Vice President 
and the resulting bad press.62 With advisors telling him that water 
was a promising front for innovation in environmental policy, 
candidate Bush declared to Sports Afield magazine, “My position on 
wetlands is straightforward. All existing wetlands, no matter how 
small, should be preserved.”63 From this bold statement grew the “no 
net loss” policy. 
Conveniently for the campaign, the work of the National 
Wetlands Policy Forum task force, which had several Bush advisors in 
 
 61. PITTMAN & WAITE, supra note 1, at 93 (quoting William K. Reilly, then an advisor to the 
campaign). 
 62. Id. at 90. 
 63. Id. at 91 (quoting presidential candidate George H.W. Bush). 
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its ranks, was nearing completion.64 The task force had been formed to 
review Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), the target of 
significant controversy during the Reagan Administration.65 Section 
404(a) of the CWA authorizes the Secretary of the Army, through the 
Corps of Engineers (“Corps”), to “issue permits for the discharge of 
dredged or fill material in the navigable waters of the United States at 
specified disposal sites.”66 Although the Corps is the front-line 
regulatory agency for administering this permit program, pursuant to 
Section 404(b)(1) of the CWA, the EPA must promulgate substantive 
permitting standards focused on environmental factors, known as the 
“404(b)(1) Guidelines,” which the Corps must follow when issuing 
permits for disposal of dredged or fill material.67 Under Section 404(c), 
the EPA also may deny (or “veto”) any disposal site if the discharge 
“will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, 
shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding 
areas), wildlife, or recreational areas.”68 Thus, under Section 404, and 
subject to specified exceptions, wetlands subject to federal jurisdiction 
may be filled only if the Corps grants a permit in accordance with the 
EPA’s 404(b)(1) Guidelines. These permits, known ubiquitously as 
“404 permits,” “wetland permits,” or “Corps permits,” have become the 
cornerstone for federal protection of wetland resources, and many 
states implement similar programs to cover wetland resources not 
within the scope of the federal program.69 
By the end of the Reagan Administration, the Section 404 
program had become vilified by development industry interests and a 
political target in Congress. In 1987, EPA Administrator Lee Thomas 
asked the Conservation Foundation think tank to convene a task 
force, the previously mentioned National Wetlands Policy Forum, to 
forge a solution.70 Borrowing from New Jersey’s experience with 
aquatic resource protection policy, the task force’s report adopted the 
simple idea that “any taking of wetlands would be replaced by the 
 
 64. For a complete history of the task force, a group of twenty state and local officials, 
environmentalists, and land developers, see RESOLVE, INC., CASE: NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY 
FORUM (2003), available at http://www.resolv.org/experience/cases/pdfs/wetlands.pdf (describing 
the task force process in detail). 
 65. PITTMAN & WAITE, supra note 1, at 92. 
 66. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2008). 
 67. Id. § 1344(b). 
 68. Id. § 1344(c). 
 69. For background on the scope of federal wetlands regulation, see Douglas R. Williams & 
Kim Dana Connolly, Federal Wetlands Regulation: An Overview, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: 
UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404, at 1, 1–26 (Kim Dana Connolly et al. eds., 2005). 
 70. See PITTMAN & WAITE, supra note 1, at 91–93 (describing the Foundation’s initial 
efforts). 
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addition of wetlands somewhere else.”71 The brilliance of the idea was 
that it would drive policy toward an “equilibrium between losses and 
gains” to achieve “no overall net loss of the nation’s remaining wetland 
base.”72 With this as an interim goal, the task force recommended net 
increases in the long term.73 
The Bush campaign gravitated immediately to the flexibility of 
the “no net loss” component of the task force recommendation. On 
August 31, 1988, while fishing in Lake Erie, Bush spoke about how 
important wetlands are to hunters and fishers, then proclaimed that 
“one state has a policy of ‘no net loss’ of wetlands, and it has 
worked . . . . [a]nd that state is not a no-growth, no development state. 
I believe this should be our national goal—no net loss of wetlands.”74 
Candidate Michael Dukakis ridiculed the speech as an “election year 
conversion,” but the next day Bush famously toured the murky waters 
of Boston Harbor to slam his opponent’s own environmental 
performance.75 “No net loss” thereafter was never far from candidate 
Bush’s lips; indeed, candidate Bush was reportedly far out in front of 
his advisors in committing to “no net loss.”76 
Bush undoubtedly saw advantages in “no net loss” he could not 
have achieved in the election by committing to another standard. It 
allowed him to appeal to multiple constituencies without alienating 
any: conservative and independent conservationists such as hunting 
and fishing enthusiasts would endorse the conservation message, 
while land development and property rights supporters would endorse 
the flexibility of the macro-scaled national standard that did not 
explicitly incorporate a restoration goal. But the real gaming began 
almost immediately after Bush won the election. 
In implementing a “no net loss” policy, the EPA and the Corps 
added four additional twists to the campaign promises, each of which 
parallels the essential baseline attributes identified in Part I. First, to 
solidify the policy as a fixed baseline, the agencies described it as “the 
national goal of no overall net loss of the nation’s remaining wetlands 
base,”77 with no mention of future net gains as a goal.78 This addressed 
 
 71. Id. at 93. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 94 (quoting from various original sources). 
 75. Id. at 95. 
 76. See id. (“It was, in fact, beyond what the other members of Bush’s administration would 
put up with.”). 
 77. Memorandums of Agreement (MOA); Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1); Corrections, 55 
Fed. Reg. 9,210, 9,211 (Mar. 12, 1990). 
 78. Id. at 9,210–13 (no mention of restoration). 
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the regulatory goal attribute. Second, the agencies explained that 
their contribution toward “no net loss” would be through 
implementation of a Section 404 “goal of no net loss of values and 
functions,”79 thus blurring whether the baseline metrics would be 
functional values or acreage. This addressed the baseline metrics 
attribute. Third, the agencies drove home the macro scale of the policy 
by stating that “it is recognized that no net loss of wetlands functions 
and values may not be achieved in each and every permit action.”80 
This addressed the margin of deviation attribute. 
In the final and most significant strategic move of joint 
implementation, the agencies enshrined compensatory mitigation and 
opened the door to the new concept of wetlands mitigation banking 
(“WMB”), which addressed all of the baseline attributes. WMB does 
not merely allow but depends on replacement of wetlands filled at one 
site by restoration of large contiguous areas of wetlands at potentially 
distant locations.81 When a land development project involves filling of 
wetland areas regulated under Section 404 of the CWA, the Corps 
usually requires compensatory mitigation for the loss of wetland 
functions as a condition of approval.82 Permittees traditionally have 
accomplished this compensatory mitigation directly through creation 
or enhancement of wetlands on the development site (onsite 
mitigation) or on an offsite location (offsite mitigation), or by paying a 
fee to fund wetland mitigation by a third party conservation entity in 
lieu of providing direct mitigation (in-lieu fee mitigation).83 WMB, 
which arose in the mid-1990s and is now a dominant mitigation 
method, provides a third-party variation on offsite mitigation by 
allowing the developer to compensate for the resource loss by 
purchasing “credits” from another landowner—the wetland banker—
who has created or enhanced wetland resources elsewhere.84 As a 
 
 79. Id. at 9,211. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 9,212. 
 82. For history and background on the compensatory mitigation program, see JESSICA 
WILKINSON & JARED THOMPSON, ENVTL. L. INST., 2005 STATUS REPORT ON COMPENSATORY 
MITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); Palmer Hough & Morgan Robertson, Mitigation 
Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: Where It Comes from, What It Means, 17 WETLANDS 
ECOLOGY & MGMT. 15 (2009). 
 83. For detailed explanations of each type of compensatory mitigation, see ENVTL L. INST., 
BANKS AND FEES: THE STATUS OF OFF-SITE MITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2002); 
WILKINSON & THOMPSON, supra note 82; Royal C. Gardner, Mitigation, in WETLANDS LAW AND 
POLICY: UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404, at 253, 253–82 (Kim Dana Connolly et al. eds., 2005). 
 84. For the history and structure of wetland mitigation banking, see MICHAEL BEAN ET AL., 
ENVTL. L. INST. & ENVTL. DEF., DESIGN OF U.S. HABITAT BANKING SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT THE 
CONSERVATION OF WILDLIFE HABITAT AND AT-RISK SPECIES 29–120 (2008) (including survey of 
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result of these four moves, just months after Bush had taken office the 
“no net loss” historic baseline was infused with tremendous policy 
flexibility. 
The office of the Vice President sought to get involved as well, 
though in a less nuanced approach to gaming that sought to redefine 
the baseline metrics. Vice President Dan Quayle, chairing the 
Competitiveness Council, tried to change what counted as a wetland. 
Quayle coordinated an effort to have the Corps revise what is known 
as the “wetlands delineation manual.”85 Wetlands, left undefined in 
the CWA, were defined in Corps regulations at the time as lands 
“inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency or 
duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances 
do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in 
saturated soil conditions.”86 The Corps implemented this water-plants-
soils test in the field through the delineation manual. Simply changing 
the definition in the manual, therefore, could dramatically change the 
“no net loss” baseline. In August 1991, the Corps and the EPA did just 
that,87 promptly igniting a firestorm of controversy with the charge 
this time being that the rules were too restrictive.88 Facing relentless 
criticism, the Corps and the EPA did not finalize the proposal and 
reverted to the 1987 Manual, which Congress later mandated be used 
 
state practices and comprehensive bibliographies); ENVTL. L. INST., WETLAND MITIGATION 
BANKING (1993); Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, 
and Takings, 81 IOWA L. REV. 527 (1993). 
 85. The Wetlands Delineation Manual is a guidance document for determining the presence 
of wetlands at a project site. Its tortured history begins with its first published version in 1987, 
which was applied on an ad hoc basis around the nation in Corps field offices. See ENVTL. LAB., 
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, TECHNICAL REPORT NO. Y-87-1, CORPS OF ENGINEERS WETLANDS 
DELINEATION MANUAL (1987), available at http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/ops/regulatory/reg_ 
manual.asp. In 1989, the Corps and several other federal agencies issued an Interagency 
Wetlands Delineation Manual in response to criticism that the agencies were using inconsistent 
standards to identify jurisdictional wetlands under various statutes. Critics of the 1989 manual 
claimed that it greatly expanded regulatory jurisdiction, which was borne out by its application. 
See, e.g., Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the Corps 
found 230 acres of jurisdiction wetlands on a 470-acre parcel under the 1989 manual after 
revoking a prior delineation under the 1987 manual that found only seventeen acres of 
jurisdictional wetlands). This controversy set the stage for a reversal by the Bush 
Administration. 
 86. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2010). 
 87. Proposed Revisions to 1989 Wetlands Manual, 56 Fed. Reg. 40,446 (Aug. 14, 1991); see 
also United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462, 464 (4th Cir. 1992) (discussing history). 
 88. See WHITE HOUSE OFFICE ON ENVTL. POL’Y, PROTECTING AMERICA’S WETLANDS: A FAIR, 
FLEXIBLE, AND EFFECTIVE APPROACH (1993) (discussing history), available at http://www. 
wetlands.com/fed/aug93wet.htm. The new manual’s approach to delineation, it was estimated by 
one Corps biologist at the time, would have excluded half of the Everglades from coverage under 
Section 404. PITTMAN & WAITE, supra note 1, at 97. 
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until a final manual is adopted.89 The 1987 Manual remains in effect 
to this day.90 
President Clinton made no similar mistake, promising even to 
produce net gains in wetlands. Like him, his successors in the Oval 
Office have also left “no let loss” alone, relying on its inherent 
flexibility to provide room for the agencies to implement the 
compensatory mitigation program. Indeed, over time the workhorse of 
the “no net loss” policy—mitigation banking—has only strengthened 
in its position.91 Given the amount of gaming in how the policy was 
designed and applied, however, one must go beyond the mere fact of 
longevity and ask a harder question—has no net loss really worked? 
That question can be answered on several levels. The first is 
the obvious: Has there been no net loss of wetlands? Focusing on acres 
as the metric, the answer is, roughly, yes. Separate studies by the 
Fish & Wildlife Service and the National Resource Conservation 
Service have demonstrated that the annual net loss rate had fallen 
from 500,000 acres annually thirty years before to slight gains under 
the “no net loss policy.”92 
 
 89. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-377, 106 
Stat. 1315, 1324 (1992). For President Bush the plan backfired as well, as candidate Bill Clinton 
relentlessly pinned Bush’s environmental record to the effort to hand over half of the nation’s 
wetlands to developers. PITTMAN & WAITE, supra note 1, at 100. 
 90. See United States. v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 803 n.7 (8th Cir. 2009) (deferring to the 1987 
manual). 
 91. In 2008 the Corps and the EPA jointly published rules overhauling their compensatory 
mitigation program under Section 404 and securing mitigation banking as the preferred 
approach. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 325, 332 (2010); 40 C.F.R. § 230; see also Compensatory Mitigation for 
Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594 (Apr. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 
325, 332, and 40 C.F.R. pt. 230) (describing the final rule). For a comprehensive review of the 
new rules, see Symposium, Biodiversity Protection and Mitigation: Mitigation Regulation 
Articles, 38 STETSON L. REV. 213 (2009). 
 92. As the Congressional Research Service has summarized: 
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service periodically surveys national net trends in wetland 
acreage using the National Wetlands Inventory (NWI). It has estimated that when 
European settlers first arrived, wetland acreage in the area that would become the 48 
states was more than 220 million acres, or about 5% of the total land area. By 2004, 
total wetland acreage was estimated to be 107.7 million acres, according to data it 
presented in its most recent survey. Data compiled by the NRCS and the FWS in 
separate surveys and using different methodologies have identified similar trends. 
Both show that the annual net loss rate dropped from almost 500,000 acres annually 
nearly three decades ago to slight net annual gains in recent years. The FWS survey 
estimated the average annual gain between 1998 and 2004 was 32,000 acres, 
primarily associated with the expansion of shallow ponds, while NRCS (using its 
Natural Resources Inventory (NRI) of privately-owned lands) estimated that there 
was an average annual gain of 26,000 acres between 1997 and 2002. NRCS cautioned 
against making precise claims of net increases because of statistical uncertainties. 
Some environmentalists caution that the increases identified in the latest FWS data 
are tied to a proliferation of small ponds rather than natural wetlands. 
ZINN & COPELAND, supra note 3, at 5 (footnote call number omitted). 
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The official policy of the EPA and the Corps, however, is to 
count “values and functions,” and on those metrics intense 
disagreement remains over whether the standard has been met. A 
study we compiled in 2000 demonstrated that the agencies had no 
coherent methodology for counting functions or values, and rendered 
the vast majority of their compensatory mitigation decisions by simply 
counting acres.93 Indeed, to this day no national accounting of wetland 
functions and values exists to reliably evaluate whether no net loss 
has occurred, and Corps officials have openly conceded that the agency 
“cannot demonstrate or document we have achieved it.”94 Local and 
regional case studies invariably show net losses at those scales,95 and 
the National Research Council concluded in 2001 that the 
compensatory mitigation system was essentially a failure in this 
respect.96 
Moreover, the distribution of functions and values across the 
landscape unquestionably has been transformed. In 2006, we 
conducted a comprehensive study of WMB-based compensatory 
mitigation in Florida, which showed that wetlands systematically had 
been filled in densely-populated coastal urban areas and “replaced” 
with wetlands in sparsely-populated rural areas, with an average 
distance between fill and mitigation sites of over fifteen miles.97 Our 
findings have since been replicated in other states.98 Compensatory 
mitigation thus has led to widespread wetlands migration. Whether 
this trend should be cause for concern is a complex question. There is 
no question, though, that the “no net loss” policy, pitched as a national 
approach tied to 1990 levels, has provided the Corps and the EPA 
ample flexibility to implement the policy according to a wide array of 
agency objectives while still technically abiding by the standard. One 
cynically might say, therefore, the “no net loss” historic baseline has 
“worked” on all levels—exactly the way it was intended. 
 
 93. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental 
Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 611–12 (2000). 
 94. PITTMAN & WAITE, supra note 1, at 100 (quoting then-Assistant Secretary of the Army 
John Paul Woodley, Jr.). 
 95. See, e.g., R. Eugene Turner et al., Count It by Acre or Function—Mitigation Adds up to 
Net Losses of Wetlands, NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSL., Nov.–Dec. 2001, at 5, 5. 
 96. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT 2–3 (2001). 
 97. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Effects of Wetlands Mitigation Banking on People, 
NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSL., Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 1, 8–13. 
 98. See J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman & Iris Goodman, Implementing the New Ecosystem 
Services Mandate of the Section 404 Compensatory Mitigation Program—A Catalyst for 
Advancing Science and Policy, 38 STETSON L. REV. 251, 258–59 (2009) (summarizing studies that 
demonstrate similar findings in other states). 
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B.  The Strategy of Gaming Historic Baselines 
We now turn to a closer examination of the specific gaming 
strategies, starting in each case with the “no net loss” example but 
adding cases from other settings as well, to illustrate the different 
ways such a strategy can be used. 
1.  Gaming the Temporal Reference Point 
Perhaps the most important gaming opportunity provided by 
historic baselines that other types of standards cannot employ is 
history itself—in particular, the malleability and obscurity of history. 
In addition to using the “no net loss” policy to illustrate this point, we 
provide two other cases below. 
a. No Net Loss, After Losing 100 Million Acres 
In the wetlands policy context, any attempt to fix a numeric- or 
risk-based standard in 1990 likely would have touched off a political 
battle. If the number proposed had been, for example, 100 million 
acres of wetlands, which was roughly what was thought to be the 
number of acres at the time, questions about the right number, proper 
metric, and desired focus (for example, why not focus on restoration to 
a larger number) all would have been spotlighted. If the proposal had 
been to provide a sliding scale of protection based on quality of 
wetlands, questions about the scale, the qualities that matter most, 
and whether to focus on enhancing the quality of wetlands all would 
have been raised. Had the policy adopted a historic baseline date of 
1900, there would have been the question of how many acres (or 
functions and values) existed in 1900. There is little agreement even 
to this day about any of those questions, hence those approaches 
would not likely have given candidate Bush or his successors much of 
a policy with which to work. 
With a “no net loss” standard pegged to the date of 
implementation (1990), by contrast, no president using the policy has 
ever had to pin down a number or differentiate between wetlands. The 
baseline is whatever wetlands were there in 1990. Knowing the 
absolute number of acres in 1990 may not even be necessary, because 
applying “no net loss” means the number—whatever it was—
theoretically stays constant and one simply measures subsequent 
gains and losses. The vexing questions surrounding restoration and 
enhancement were rhetorically obscured beneath this bold line in 
history the policy drew. The 100 million acres of wetlands the nation 
1b. Ruhl-Salzman_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/24/2011 2:28 PM 
2011] GAMING THE PAST 37 
had lost up until 1990 were in the unfortunate past. “No net loss” 
drew a line in the sand. It triumphantly put an end to more losses and 
would keep it that way in perpetuity. 
An even more telling effect of “no net loss” on wetlands policy is 
that it has allowed administrations to proclaim “net gain” policies.99 
Viewed through a longer time horizon, however, claims of any “gain” 
are deceptive. At best, it is just a small recoupment of wetlands lost 
prior to 1990. Moreover, the fundamental question remains—no net 
loss or net gain of what? Nonetheless, the policy and WMB remain 
standing proud. As far as gaming a standard on its face goes, “no net 
loss” has been nothing short of brilliant—its flexibility made possible 
by the temporal reference point. 
b. The Kyoto Protocol and the Magic of 1990 
The Kyoto Protocol and climate change offer another example 
of the gaming made possible through temporal reference points. 
Although the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997, the baseline year 
was up for grabs. Data sufficient for establishing baselines went back 
several years. As with many international environmental 
negotiations, a fundamental challenge lies in ensuring that a 
sufficient number of countries become parties to the treaty. There 
must be sufficient inducements for parties to join, all the while not 
undermining the very goals of the treaty in the first place. 
As described earlier, the Kyoto Protocol set 1990 as the 
baseline year for carbon dioxide emissions reductions. Parties to the 
Protocol chose this date explicitly because it pre-dated the fall of the 
Iron Curtain. The collapse of Soviet economies after 1990 meant that 
these countries had effectively been given emissions reduction credits 
they could sell at a later date.100 
Put another way, because countries in economic transition 
currently emit at levels far below their levels in 1990, many of these 
countries will not emit their assigned amounts under the Kyoto 
Protocol, even assuming they take no steps to reduce greenhouse gases. 
Under the Protocol, these countries may be permitted to sell this 
so-called “hot air” to other Kyoto parties with emissions reduction 
obligations. Elimination of this “loophole” would have increased the 
amount of emissions reduction actually needed to reach the target level. 
 
99. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 100. It is interesting to note that a later baseline was chosen for different gases. In fact, 1995 
was set as the baseline year for three relatively minor but potent greenhouse gases 
(hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride). 
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It is likely that, without the availability of “hot air” credits, the United 
States and several other countries would have adopted less stringent 
targets. Thus, the choice of baseline year in 1990 served both as an 
inducement for former Soviet bloc countries to sign the treaty and as a 
general subsidy to kick-start the program into effect. 
c. Salmon and the Endangered Species Act 
The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) offers a minefield of 
historic baselines ripe for this kind of gaming. For example, Section 4 
of the ESA requires the FWS and the National Marine Fisheries 
Service (“NMFS”) to identify endangered species,101 which the statute 
defines as any species “in danger of extinction throughout all or a 
significant portion of its range.”102 Although this mandate is forward-
looking, it is difficult to know where a species is headed without also 
looking into its past and recent trends. Nevertheless, a battle ensued 
between courts and the agencies during the Bush Administration over 
how to select historical baseline reference points for the “range” 
component of the standard. The Ninth Circuit explained in 2001 that 
a species “can be extinct ‘throughout . . . a significant portion of its 
range’ if there are any major geographical areas in which it was no 
longer viable but once was.”103 On behalf of the FWS, however, the 
Solicitor of the Department of the Interior took the position that the 
plain meaning of the statute required “range” to mean “current 
range’’, not “historical range.” This is because “to say a species ‘is in 
danger’ in an area where it no longer exists—i.e., in its historical 
range—would be inconsistent with common usage.”104 Of course, a 
sign that a species might be endangered may be that it no longer 
exists in many places it used to call its range. Moreover, the agency’s 
“current range” approach means that a species’ range could be 
shrinking continuously but that would never show up in the 
significant portion of range analysis, making the approach even less 
demanding than a “no net loss” baseline. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has 
since reiterated that it expects the FWS “first to quantify . . . historical 
range in order to establish a ‘temporal baseline,’ and then to 
determine whether the lost habitat, measured against that baseline, 
 
 101. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2008). 
 102. Id. § 1532(6). 
 103. Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 104. Memorandum from Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Director, U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Serv., On the Meaning of “In Danger of Extinction Throughout All or a Significant 
Portion of its Range” 7–8, (Mar. 16, 2007), available at http://www.doi.gov/solicitor/opinions/M-
37013.pdf. 
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amounts to a significant portion of the species’ overall range.”105 Also, 
a long list of scientists has urged the Obama Administration to adopt 
the “historic range” baseline approach.106 Regardless of which 
statutory interpretation is most faithful to text and congressional 
intent, the episode speaks volumes about the impact gaming of 
reference points can have on implementation of historic baselines. 
Also subject to reference point gaming is the baseline approach 
taken under Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, which prohibits federal 
agencies from engaging in or approving actions that jeopardize the 
continued existence of a species listed under Section 4.107 An agency 
contemplating such an action must consult with the FWS or the 
NMFS (if the species is a marine species or anadromous fish) and 
request an opinion on whether the actions are prohibited under the 
Act.108 These so-called “biological opinions” must assess the impacts of 
the proposed activity when added to an “environmental baseline,” 
which is defined as “the past and present impacts of all Federal, State, 
or private actions and other human activities in the action area, the 
anticipated impacts of all proposed Federal projects in the action area 
. . . and the impact of State or private actions which are 
contemporaneous with the consultation in progress.”109 By 
incorporating “the past,” this baseline opens the door to reference 
point gaming. For example, when preparing a 1993 biological opinion 
on the salmon mortality effects of hydropower dam operations in the 
Columbia River basin, the NMFS measured the projected effects of the 
operations against an environmental baseline period of 1986–1990, 
which the agency justified as a period of “consistent management 
practices” for the dams.110 That period, however, was unusually short 
compared to baselines the agency had used in previous consultations 
on the dams, and it just so happened to encompass a period of low 
salmon abundance. 
The combined effect was to make the comparison between 
baseline period salmon population and projected 1993 salmon 
population look more favorable than had the NMFS used a longer 
 
 105. Tucson Herpetological Soc’y v. Salazar, 566 F.3d 870, 875–76 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 106. Letter from Erica Antill et al. to Ken Salazar, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Interior (Dec. 10, 2009), 
available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/cleaning_up_the_bush_legacy/pdfs/ 
Scientists_letter_on_SPOIR_Memo.pdf (arguing that the current range approach “sharply limits 
the scope of the ESA”). 
 107. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
 108. Id. § 1536(b). 
 109. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2010). 
 110. Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 892 (D. 
Or. 1994), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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baseline period, which would have included years of higher salmon 
abundance. The reference point gaming thus allowed the NMFS to 
conclude that no jeopardy would occur. The court reviewing the action 
described the agency as having “selected this critical variable in its 
jeopardy equation by reference to ‘consistent management practices,’ a 
factor which necessarily focuses more upon system capability than 
upon the needs of the species.”111 Putting it more frankly, Professor 
Michael Blumm has described the agency’s move as a manipulation 
that “finessed its jeopardy analysis, blinding itself from scientific 
reality.”112 It was also not an isolated example, with the FWS and the 
NMFS several years later committing the same “finessing” of the 
baseline reference period for consultations over irrigation reservoir 
operations in the Klamath River Basin.113 
2.  Gaming the Baseline Metrics 
Gaming the temporal reference point depends in part on the 
relative uncertainty about the past compared to the present. But even 
if perfect knowledge is available about conditions in the past, historic 
baselines can still be gamed by manipulating the baseline metrics. 
The most blatant example is Quayle’s failed effort to alter the 
wetlands delineation criteria. But “no net loss” was a shell game from 
the start. The Corps and the EPA quickly gamed the metrics by 
claiming to measure “functions and values,” all the while counting 
acres as their proxies.114 While easy to measure, acres are a poor proxy 
for value or function, since they tell nothing about the type of wetland, 
its location, or its service provision.115 Pinning down whether “no net 
loss” has been achieved has thus remained an ongoing debate. Every 
administration has nonetheless claimed success and produced 
numbers and reports purporting to show it. 
Moreover, the metrics of the “no net loss” policy were scaled at 
the national level while the metrics of agency implementation were 
scaled at the project permit level. By adopting a nationally scaled 
historic baseline, “no net loss” established a macro perspective so that 
 
 111. Id. at 893. 
 112. Michael C. Blumm et al., Practiced in the Art of Deception: The Failure of Columbia 
Basin Salmon Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 36 ENVTL. L. 709, 736–37 (2006). 
 113. See A. Dan Tarlock, Ecosystem Services in the Klamath Basin: Battlefield Casualties or 
the Future?, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 207, 240 (2007) (explaining that the FWS “designated a 
relatively wet period . . . as the baseline”). 
114. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 115. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 93, at 648–67 (examining market constraints in 
wetlands mitigation banking). 
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not every individual project would necessarily come out at no net loss. 
This took pressure off of individual project permit decisions and 
opened the door to compensatory mitigation through WMB.116 
Similarly, the environmental baseline approach used in the 
ESA consultation process discussed above is susceptible to 
manipulation of baseline metrics. The purpose of the baseline is to 
serve as the reference point for impact analysis, with the question 
being whether the new impacts caused by the project under 
consultation, when added to the baseline impacts, would jeopardize 
the species. Therefore, even when the temporal reference point for the 
baseline is set appropriately, “what information is included in the 
environmental baseline often determines whether the agency will find 
that the action jeopardizes a listed species.”117 For example, in 
litigation reviewing several of the NMFS’s Columbia River salmon “no 
jeopardy” biological opinions, courts have rejected the agency’s 
rationales for excluding different kinds of ongoing impacts from the 
environmental baseline. The concern has been that the exclusions 
would render the environmental baseline a “vacuum,” all but assuring 
that the additional impacts of dam operations under review in the 
consultation would not tip the species to jeopardy.118 
3.  Gaming the Margin of Deviation 
Everyone knows that the past never completely repeats itself, 
so historic baselines inherently contain some margin of deviation from 
the standard. But how much deviation is tolerable? Adopting numeric- 
or risk-based standards brings the slippage question to center stage. 
Historic baselines, by contrast, can allow a more nuanced approach to 
margins of deviation. For example, with “no net loss,” policy success 
was assessed only at the national scale, and no individual project was 
invariably held accountable to the national policy. The incorporation 
of wetlands mitigation banking also suspended any requirement that 
compensatory wetlands had to be close to the filled wetlands. As a 
result, the national “no net loss” baseline was detached from any 
 
116. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 117. Matthew Gerhart, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: The Difficulty of 
Proving Causation, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 167, 177 (2009) (examining the difficulty of baseline 
metrics for climate change impacts). 
 118. Nat’l. Wildlife Fed’n. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 929–30 (9th Cir. 
2008) (discussing similar cases). See generally Michael C. Blumm & Hallison T. Putnam, 
Imposing Judicial Restraints on the “Art of Deception”: The Courts Cast a Skeptical Eye on 
Columbia Basin Salmon Restoration Efforts, 38 ENVTL. L. 47, 52–53 (2008) (discussing the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning). 
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potential local “no net loss” baseline. As our studies and others have 
shown, this has led to significant net losses of wetlands on numerous 
local and regional scales.119 It is only when net gains experienced in 
the other areas through compensatory mitigation are counted that the 
“no net loss” standard (in acres) is achieved at the national scale. In 
short, no net loss nationally does not mean no net loss everywhere in 
the nation—a margin of deviation intentionally incorporated into the 
policy to facilitate the permitting process. 
a. Grandfathering Under the Clean Air Act 
Under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), whenever a new source with 
significant emissions arises or an existing source undergoes major 
modification that results in significant emissions of a criteria 
pollutant, the facility must undergo a process known as New Source 
Review (“NSR”). In simple terms, this review determines which 
pollution control technologies must be installed. NSR is generally an 
expensive proposition and one that industry would like to avoid. In the 
1977 amendments to the CAA, plants operating prior to 1970 were 
exempted from NSR.120 This exemption created a whole category of so-
called “grandfathered” sources that did not have to comply with more 
stringent CAA requirements going forward. 
Why were new and existing stationary sources treated 
differently? Part of the reason was clearly political. Existing source 
owners and operators had much more clout in Congress than parties 
who would operate plants in the future. Part was fairness, given the 
high cost of retro-fitting an existing plant. And part was convenience, 
since it was assumed that this exemption would not be of long-term 
importance. The grandfathered plants would shut down over time to 
make way for more modern, efficient, and cleaner facilities. 
One can also view the story of grandfathering as an extreme 
baseline gaming strategy. The grandfathering provision effectively 
says that plants operating prior to 1970 have a 100 percent margin of 
deviation privilege. So long as the new source and major modification 
emissions thresholds are not triggered, the plants operate in the pre-
1977 CAA world and are exempted from NSR. Indeed, in practice the 
law was extensively gamed. Grandfathering created an incentive to 
keep older facilities operating as long as possible, and many coal-fired 
 
 119. See Karl Blankenship, ‘No Net Loss’ Proves to Be an Elusive Wetlands Goal, 4 
CHESAPEAKE BAY J., Apr. 1994, para. 4, available at http://www.bayjournal.com/article. 
cfm?article=168 (examining the “no net loss” baseline in the Chesapeake Bay wetland program). 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) (2008). 
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utilities did just this. Under the guise of minor modifications, utilities 
quite literally rebuilt their facilities to extend their life, all the while 
continuing to benefit from being grandfathered.121 
b. The Clean Air Act and Dirty Old Cars 
As part of the CAA of 1970, Congress used a historic baseline to 
set a strikingly ambitious goal. Car manufacturers were required to 
reduce ninety percent of carbon monoxide (“CO”) and hydrocarbon 
(“HC”) emissions by 1975.122 Ambitious goals are uncommon in 
environmental law, but certainly not unheard of. What was unheard 
of, however, was the authority granted to the EPA effectively to shut 
down the auto industry if the goals were not met. The “technology-
forcing” story is the subject of the famous case, International 
Harvester v. Ruckelshaus.123 Our interest is less in the game of high-
stakes chicken between the EPA and the Big Three automakers than 
in how the goal was gamed. 
As Jon-Mark Stensvaag has well described, the EPA’s 
guidelines for assessing compliance significantly favored the auto 
industry. For starters, the baseline levels of CO and HC were not the 
regulatory standards for these emissions already in place in 1970, but 
rather actual vehicle emissions. As a result, “this approach put a 
premium on noncompliance in 1970, and resulted in more lenient 
standards for 1975.”124 Second, in testing compliance, inspectors 
examined prototype models built specifically for testing, not cars off 
the production line. Third, compliance was met by averaging the test 
results rather than requiring each car to pass. When cars off the 
assembly line were tested, up to forty percent of the cars were allowed 
to fail. Perhaps most surprising, during the testing of prototypes for 
the 50,000 mile test, manufacturers were allowed to replace the 
catalytic converter once—something that rarely happens in practice. 
Stensvaag points out other favorable testing protocols as well, but the 
point is clear: the use of a target based off a historic baseline 
introduced enormous flexibility to take what appeared to be an 
 
 121. See, e.g., United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 544–45 (4th Cir. 2005) 
vacated, 549 U.S. 561 (holding that revisions over a twelve-year period, some costing many times 
the price of the original facility, did not trigger the major modifications emissions threshold). 
 122. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(A). 
 123. Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 626–27 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 124. JOHN-MARK STENSVAAG, TEACHER’S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY MATERIALS ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 283–286 (1999). 
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extremely strict target and weaken it in application, all the while 
hiding this from the general public.125 
c. The Wilderness Act 
Signed into law in 1964, the Wilderness Act contains some of 
the most lyrical language found in any environmental law, calling for 
the protection of natural areas “where the earth and community of life 
are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not 
remain.”126 In particular, Congress declared that undeveloped public 
lands would be managed to retain their “primeval character and 
influence, without permanent improvements of human habitation, 
which . . . [are] protected and managed so as to preserve . . . [their] 
natural conditions.”127 The baseline of wilderness seemed self-evident. 
A closer look, however, reveals a wide margin of deviation. Despite the 
general prohibition on commercial or development activity in 
wilderness areas, the statute contains exemptions for a wide range of 
heavy impact activities resulting from pre-existing uses at the time of 
the designation. Thus road building, livestock grazing, and motorized 
recreation are allowed to continue.128 One might argue that these are 
not margins of deviation but, rather, the true baseline since they 
existed at the time of wilderness designation. This brings to mind the 
earlier example of commercial oyster harvesting in the Point Reyes 
National Seashore.129 Keep in mind, though, that the Wilderness Act 
went so far as to allow new mining activities in some wilderness areas 
located in national forests for twenty years after the Act was 
adopted.130 
C. Is Gaming Good or Bad? 
This Section has provided detailed examples of gaming historic 
baselines, but gaming is by no means restricted to historic baselines. 
Any kind of standard is susceptible to gaming through use of a healthy 
margin of deviation. The same can be said of performance metrics. A 
risk-based standard can be softened by adding “to the extent feasible,” 
or a technology-based standard could be expressed through loose 
metrics such as “industry standards.” As the ninety percent mobile 
 
125. Id. at 283–86. 
 126. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. § 1133(d). 
129. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 130.  16 U.S.C. § 1131(d). 
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sources reduction story makes clear, gaming can take place in the 
definition of compliance, and can occur even if the goal is an absolute 
emissions cap with no baseline at all. The same is true for the current 
climate change debate over carbon taxes versus a cap-and-trade 
system.131 Both systems are susceptible to gaming, with or without 
baselines. 
It is not the opportunity for gaming that sets historic baselines 
apart but, rather, the fact that only historic baselines also have a 
temporal reference point. This characteristic adds an additional 
dimension for gaming that is lacking in other types of goals. Historic 
baselines may not always provide the best fit for particular policies, 
but they do provide a qualitatively different opportunity for gaming 
than other types of standards. In other words, as the examples in this 
Section demonstrate, gaming the temporal reference point can provide 
significant political opportunity and administrative flexibility. In this 
sense, in many contexts historic baselines should provide greater 
capacity for gaming than other standards, and the gaming may be 
more easily obscured. 
But is a greater or different opportunity for gaming a positive 
or negative attribute? To be sure, the story related by Stensvaag is 
sobering (and often met with outrage by students in our 
environmental law classes). It is not at all clear, however, that this 
was a bad result. After all, by the end of the 1970s, catalytic 
converters were standard features in cars and trucks, and mobile 
source emissions had reduced dramatically. In effect, the testing 
methodologies provided a subsidy of sorts to the auto industry, making 
compliance easier in the short term. The gaming of the Kyoto baseline 
served a similar purpose, placing hot air reductions in the market and 
making it easier for parties to meet their reduction obligations. 
As a result of gaming historic baselines, political deals have 
been reached and laws adopted. As these examples demonstrate, 
gaming provides the policy space to address the needs of competing 
interests and come up with a final result that works in practice. The 
weaker goal that results is surely a downside, but one that must be 
balanced against the concrete achievement of a goal fixed in law. Of 
course, there can also be too much flexibility in the administration of a 
standard, where politics undermine the goal. As with other 
instruments and approaches in the policy toolkit, gaming baselines is 
 
 131. Tax advocates point out that the allocation of allowances and use of generous offsets can 
undermine the cap-and-trade program’s integrity, while cap-and-trade proponents argue that tax 
credits, deductions, and exemptions can neuter the impacts of carbon taxes. Unfortunately, both 
sides are right. 
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neither inherently good nor bad; it depends on their specific 
application. 
IV. HISTORIC BASELINES AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 
This Article has now identified the basic features of historic 
baselines and assessed their respective benefits and costs in setting 
regulatory goals, with a focus on the potential for gaming. The 
question remains, however, whether this is a useful exercise. How 
does a better understanding of historic baselines inform our 
understanding of regulatory policy design and implementation? 
In answering this “so what?” challenge, this Section turns to 
the most pressing regulatory challenge of our time—climate change. 
The climate debate has largely evolved into two separate though 
related arenas—mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation focuses on 
reducing the threats of climate change by reducing the atmospheric 
concentration of greenhouse gases. It can be achieved either through 
emissions reduction at the source or sequestration of greenhouse gases 
through vegetation or technology. Adaptation focuses on minimizing 
the harms posed by the climate change that do occur. This is primarily 
an engineering or landscape management approach. There is 
increasing interest on both these fronts, with governments and 
interest groups pushing their own particular goals. In the sections 
below, we apply our analysis of historic baselines in the context of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation policy. 
A. Climate Change Mitigation—Turning Back the Clock 
Broadly speaking, mitigation strategies comprise three types of 
emissions reduction goals. Interestingly, each of these relies on 
historic baselines. The most common goal relies explicitly on a target 
based off of a historic baseline. As mentioned above, the Kyoto Protocol 
allocated reduction percentages among parties referenced to a 1990 
baseline. This strategy also proved popular in negotiations leading up 
to the Copenhagen climate summit. Heads of the richest nations, the 
G8, called for measures that will avoid a global temperature rise 
greater than two degrees centigrade compared to pre-industrial 
levels,132 supplemented by a commitment to collectively reduce 
emissions eighty percent by 2050, in the expectation that cuts by 
 
 132. Wintour & Elliott, supra note 32, at 14. 
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developing countries will result in an overall reduction of fifty 
percent.133 
Other nations have also called for targets off baselines. In the 
run-up to the Fourteenth Conference of the Parties in 2008, for 
example, the Alliance for Small Island States, a coalition of nations 
most threatened by climate change, called for global emissions 
reductions of over eighty-five percent by 2050 from a 1990 baseline, 
with developed countries’ reductions over forty percent by 2020 and 
ninety-five percent by 2050.134 These reduction targets are anchored in 
the goal of limiting temperature increases to below 1.5°C. Though 
using different numbers, the European Union, Norway, Iceland, 
African nations, and Chile have called for reductions to keep 
temperature increases below 2°C. In terms of emissions reductions, 
they have called for a fifty percent reduction by 2050 with a 1990 
baseline.135 As negotiations proceed, these numbers will surely change 
but the approach of historic baselines likely will not.136 All of these 
targets could have been expressed as tons of emissions at a specified 
date in the future, yet every nation feels compelled to introduce 
historic baselines as a way of providing a reference point. Historic 
baselines are the framing method of choice for mitigation policy. 
A second strategy relies on a qualitative target. The United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change called on 
countries to stabilize greenhouse gases below levels that would cause 
“dangerous anthropogenic interference” (“DAI”).137 As Michael Mann 
has pointed out, this goal is not a simple scientific measure. Instead, it 
leaves open a number of fundamental policy questions—dangerous to 
 
 133. Id. 
134. ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS), DECLARATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2009 
para. 6.b (Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis/documents/AOSIS 
%20Summit%20Declaration%20Sept%2021%20FINAL.pdf. 
135. Id. para. 6.b.v.; see also European Union Communication to the U.N., Limiting Global 
Climate Change to 2 Degrees Celsius (Jan. 10, 2007), available at http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article_6666_en.htm (proposing the same). 
 136. Indeed, historic baselines have become the universal language of climate change 
mitigation policy, as virtually every nation has expressed its preferred greenhouse gas reduction 
targets through one or another form of historic baseline using all variety of reference points and 
percentages. Canada, for example, has targeted a twenty percent cut from 2006 levels by 2020; 
Mexico has targeted a fifty percent cut from 2000 levels by 2050; Japan a twenty-five percent cut 
from 1990 levels by 2020; South Korea a four percent cut from 2005 levels by 2020; Russia to 
maintain emissions thirty percent below 1990 levels through 2030; and so on. Dean Scott & Eric 
J. Lyman, As Hope for Binding Climate Deal Fades, Copenhagen Aims to Be Springboard to 
2010, 40 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2733, 2734–35 (Nov. 27, 2009). 
 137. Michael E. Mann, Defining Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference, 106 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 4065, 4065–66 (2009). 
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whom, where, and when?138 Hence this approach leaves ample room 
for gaming as well. In practice, efforts to establish DAI targets have 
resorted to historic baselines. An advisory group created in the late 
1980s by the World Meteorological Organization, the International 
Council of Scientific Union, and the United Nations Environment 
Program, for example, determined that the threshold for DAI was an 
increase of 2°C global mean surface warming.139 Importantly, this 
temperature increase was measured from a baseline of pre-industrial 
levels. Noted atmospheric physicist James Hansen has more recently 
identified a one degree increase as the appropriate threshold measure, 
compared to pre-industrial temperatures.140 
The last strategy seems, on its face, to make no use of historic 
baselines. This approach sets an absolute target. The best example of 
this can be found in the group 350.org. On October 24, 2009, it 
sponsored 5,200 events in 181 countries. According to 350.org’s 
website, this was the most widespread day of environmental action in 
history. The goal of all these events was a universal call for binding 
emissions targets of 350 ppm. As the group’s website makes clear, this 
number is not arbitrary: “350 is more than a number—it’s a symbol of 
where we need to head as a planet,”141 and “[i]t’s the safety zone for 
planet earth.”142 Even here, however, the number comes from a 
historic baseline. The website goes on to explain that the purpose of 
the 350 ppm goal is “to preserve a planet similar to that on which 
civilization developed and to which life on Earth is adapted.”143 In 
other words, the 350 ppm level is calibrated to return the planet to 
pre-industrial conditions—a historic baseline in all but name. 
The main policy approach for sequestration, the flip side of 
reducing emissions, also relies on historic baselines. Popularly known 
as REDD (for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation), this approach would provide reduction credits to 
countries that reverse trends of deforestation and land degradation.144 
In a simple example, if a country has had an annual deforestation loss 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. V. Ramanathan & Y. Feng, On Avoiding Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference with the 
Climate System: Formidable Challenges Ahead, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI., 14,245, 14,245 
(2008). 
 140. Id. 
141. Mission, 350.ORG, http://www.350.org/en/mission (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 142. 350 Science, 350.ORG, http://www.350.org/en/about/science (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 143. Id. 
144. For a general explanation of REDD, see REDD: Protecting Climate, Forests and 
Livelihoods, INT’L INST. ENV’T & DEV., http://www.iied.org/natural-resources/key-issues/ 
forestry/redd-protecting-climate-forests-and-livelihoods (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
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of three percent over the last ten years, it would gain credits or be 
paid for reducing this rate of loss (for example, down to a one percent 
annual loss or even an increase in forest cover). There is strong 
support for variants of this approach, and REDD will likely be an 
integral part of any future climate treaty. Obviously, in order to 
determine the relative improvements in deforestation rates, REDD 
will have to be based on a historic baseline approach. 
In all instances, therefore, mitigation strategies build off 
historic baselines. The target and REDD approaches do so explicitly. 
Even the qualitative target of DAI and the absolute target of 350 ppm 
are implicitly tied to a time in our history when the greenhouse gas 
concentrations were not dangerous. This is then projected forward for 
current emissions targets. In the world of mitigation, then, historic 
baselines are inevitable. The situation is far different with adaptation. 
B.  Adaptation Policy—Hitting the Reset Button 
Climate change adaptation “refers to adjustment in natural or 
human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or 
their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial 
opportunities.”145 As early as 1990, many held the view that “[i]t is 
likely that no matter what policy actions we take, fully arresting the 
climate warming is just not in the cards. . . . And so the likelihood is 
that humanity will have to adapt to some climate changes.”146 Until 
recently, however, the domestic policy pendulum has swung sharply in 
mitigation’s direction, and “interest in adaptation was overwhelmed 
by concern about the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations.”147 Indeed, the 
need for an effective mitigation policy increasingly was portrayed as so 
pressing that talk of adaptation became taboo, an admission of 
surrender to the goal of reducing emissions.148 Today, however, it is 
clear that so-called committed warming—the climate change already 
built into the system as a result of past greenhouse gas emissions—
 
 145. Glossary of Climate Change Terms, EPA http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ 
glossary.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 146. Robert M. White, The Great Climate Debate, 84 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 346, 355 
(1990). 
 147. E. Lisa F. Schipper & Ian Burton, Understanding Adaptation: Origins, Concepts, 
Practice and Policy, in THE EARTHSCAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 7 (E. 
Lisa F. Schipper & Ian Burton eds., 2009). 
 148. See id. (“ ‘[A]daptationists’ were distrusted because their proposals seemed to 
undermine the need for mitigation. Critics felt that belief in the potential value of adaptation 
would soften the resolve of governments to grasp the nettle of mitigation and thus play into the 
hands of the fossils fuel interests and the climate change sceptics.”). 
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will play out for many decades, even if a political or technological 
mitigation breakthrough happened yesterday.149 Recent policy 
dialogue has thus increasingly recognized that formulating and 
implementing adaptation strategies must be an urgent and prominent 
component of our domestic climate change law and policy.150 
What role can historic baselines play in closing this “adaptation 
deficit”?151 As outlined above, mitigation policy has with good reason 
depended on historic baselines to establish emission reduction and 
sequestration goals, and is likely to continue to do so. This Section 
outlines reasons why, as attractive as historic baselines may be to 
policymakers forging new climate change adaptation strategies, 
ultimately such baselines will fail to deliver the same foundation for 
adaptation policy that they have built in the mitigation policy context. 
First, consider the policy goals. Climate change adaptation is 
designed to facilitate one or more of the following outcomes for local 
and regional human populations and for other species and their 
ecosystems: 
(1) resist the effects of climate change to maintain the status 
quo; 
 
 149. See Richard A. Kerr, How Urgent Is Climate Change?, 318 SCIENCE 1230, 1230 (2007) 
(“The system has built in time lags. Ice sheets take centuries to melt after a warming. The 
atmosphere takes decades to be warmed by today’s greenhouse gas emissions.”); Ramanathan & 
Feng, supra note 139, at 14,251 (estimating committed warming of 2.4 degrees Celsius even if 
greenhouse gas concentrations are held to 2005 levels); Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible 
Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1704, 1704 (2009) 
(estimating a 1000-year committed warming effect). For an in-depth examination of this lag 
effect and the resistance it is likely to generate against costly mitigation policy measures that 
may take decades to produce results, see Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1295, 1301–05, 1311–34 (2009). 
 150. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing 
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 17 (2009) (“Unfortunately, 
legislators and regulators in the United States and elsewhere have only begun to consider the 
role of adaptation in combating climate change.”); Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: 
Who Should Pay, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2007) (“Adaptation has been a neglected topic. 
. . . In my view, this is a mistake.”); Peter Hayes, Resilience as Emergent Behavior, 15 HASTINGS 
W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 175, 175 (2009) (“[T]he main game is now adaptation which renders 
mitigation no less urgent, but shifts the political equation in dramatic ways that cannot be 
ignored any longer.”); Thomas Lovejoy, Mitigation and Adaptation for Ecosystem Protection, 39 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,072, 10,073 (2009) (“The adaptation part of the climate 
change agenda is only just beginning to get attention, and needs much more right away.”); Ileana 
M. Porras, The City and International Law: In Pursuit of Sustainable Development, 36 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 537, 593 (2009) (“Most climate change experts and policy-makers recognize that 
adaptation and mitigation are not mutually exclusive strategies but must, on the contrary be 
employed in tandem.”). 
 151. For the term “adaptation deficit,” (losses incurred by ineffective use of available 
knowledge about climate change), see Ian Burton, Climate Change and the Adaptation Deficit, in 
THE EARTHSCAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 147, at 90–92. 
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(2) transform physical, social, environmental, or economic 
conditions to minimize harm or maximize benefits 
associated with climate change impacts; or 
(3) move humans or other species to areas with better adaptive 
capacities. 
Take as examples the city of Miami, Florida, and the nearby 
Biscayne Bay Aquatic Preserve, which the state of Florida established 
in 1974 “to be preserved in an essentially natural condition so that its 
biological and aesthetic values may endure for the enjoyment of future 
generations.”152 These human and natural environments face 
substantial threats from climate change impacts, such as sea level 
rise, introduction and loss of species, loss of coastal resources, and 
more frequent and intensive storm events. Miami’s city managers and 
the Preserve’s resource managers could adopt any of the three 
adaptation policy goals. Each could rely on historic baselines. In each 
case, however, historic baselines will not prove as effective as other 
types of standards. To be sure, historic baselines are quite appealing 
to policies aimed at resisting climate change to secure the status quo. 
After all, historic baselines such as “no net loss” seem to do just that; 
so why not use them if we want Miami and the Preserve to stay just 
the way they are through the era of climate change? The answer is 
simple—it is not possible to keep Miami and the Preserve just the way 
they are through the era of climate change. 
Natural resources managers have come to the sober conclusion 
that climate change is fundamentally different from the kind of 
ecological change they are used to managing. Resource management 
has evolved well past conceptions of nature as static and “balanced.” 
With ecology in particular, the trend over the past half-century has 
been increasingly to focus on the complex flux qualities of ecosystems 
and to place less emphasis on conceptions of stasis and natural 
stability.153 Nevertheless, the “dynamic equilibrium” model that is 
now firmly in place in ecology is based on the assumption of 
“stationarity,” which, as P.C.D. Milly explains, is “the idea that 
natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope of 
variability.”154 Although ecologists understand that the envelope can 
be stretched by natural and anthropogenic events, “justifiably or not, 
 
 152. FLA. STAT. § 258.397 (2010). 
 153. See Bryan Norton, Change, Constancy, and Creativity: The New Ecology and Some Old 
Problems, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 49, 53–55 (1996) (discussing the increased focus on 
ecological change over the last fifty years). 
 154. P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319 SCIENCE 
573, 573 (2008). 
1b. Ruhl-Salzman_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/24/2011 2:28 PM 
52 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1:1 
they generally have considered natural change and variability to be 
sufficiently small to allow stationarity-based design.”155 Thus, 
conservation programs, such as the ESA, the Wilderness Act, and the 
National Wildlife Refuge System, to this day depend heavily on the 
strategy of setting aside habitat reserves to preserve the status quo,156 
and even newer, more flexible conservation orientations, such as 
ecosystem-based management, depend strongly on the stationarity 
premise and its appeal to “natural” and “native” models of ecosystem 
dynamics.157 
But the stationarity premise is on shaky ground in the era of 
climate change. Ecologists now warn of the no-analog future—
ecological variability unprecedented in the history of ecology, riddled 
with nonlinear feedback and feed-forward loops, previously unknown 
emergent properties, and new thresholds of irreversible change.158 The 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Holly Doremus, The Endangered Species Act: Static Law Meets Dynamic World, 32 
WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 204–10 (arguing that nature preserves strive to create a static 
environment that minimizes future human interference with natural habitats). 
 157. See R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 
27, 30–31 (1994) (advocating describing a feature of ecosystem management as management of 
ecosystems for their “native” properties); Bruce Pardy, Ecosystem Management in Question: A 
Reply to Ruhl, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 213–14 (2005) (proposing management of ecosystems 
for “natural” conditions). For arguments against retaining these conceptions of “nature” as the 
policy driver in environmental law, see J.B. Ruhl, The Myth of What Is Inevitable Under 
Ecosystem Management: A Response to Pardy, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 315, 319–23 (2005); J.B. 
Ruhl, The Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue on Ecosystem Management, Part IV: Narrowing and Sharpening 
the Questions, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 25, 30–31 (2007). 
 158. Matthew C. Fitzpatrick & William W. Hargrove, The Projection of Species Distribution 
Models and the Problem of Non-Analog Climate, 18 BIODIVERSITY & CONSERVATION 2255, 2255 
(2009) (“By 2100, a quarter or more of the Earth’s land surface may experience climatic 
conditions that have no modern analog . . . .”); Douglas Fox, Back to the No-Analog Future?, 316 
SCIENCE 823, 823 (2007) (“[I]f the climate changes over the next 100 years as current models 
predict, surviving species throughout much of Earth’s land area . . . are likely to be reshuffled 
into novel ecosystems unknown today.”); Douglas Fox, When Worlds Collide, CONSERVATION, 
Jan.–Mar. 2007, at 28 (arguing that it is likely that the world will enter into a no-analog future 
within 100–200 years). The scientific literature exploring these complex dynamics and exposing 
our lack of understanding about what lies ahead as temperature rises is legion. See, e.g., Almut 
Arneth et al., Clean the Air, Heat the Planet?, 326 SCIENCE 672, 672–73 (2009) (examining the 
feedback effects between conventional air pollution control and climate change mitigation and 
concluding that complex positive and negative feedback links exist and that, on balance, the 
evidence and models suggest that “air pollution control will accelerate warming in the coming 
decades”); Gordon B. Bonan, Forests and Climate Change: Forcings, Feedbacks, and the Climate 
Benefits of Forests, 320 SCIENCE 1444, 1444–48 (2008) (explaining the complex and nonlinear 
forest-climate interactions); I. Eisenman & J.S. Wettlaufer, Nonlinear Threshold Behavior 
During the Loss of Arctic Sea Ice, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 28 (2009) (describing the nonlinear 
“tipping points” in the ice-albedo feedback effect); Jerome Gaillardet & Albert Galy, Himalaya—
Carbon Sink or Source?, 320 SCIENCE 1727, 1727–28 (2008) (explaining the uncertainties of the 
sinks and sources of the carbon geological cycle); Steven W. Running, Ecosystem Disturbance, 
Carbon, and Climate, 321 SCIENCE 652, 653 (2008) (explaining the uncertainties of ecological 
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“envelope” of variability will not merely grow in size, it will change in 
basic structure, and no analog exists in the history of ecology, 
including paleoecology for that matter, for predicting its new ground 
rules. Thus, climate change, in the words of the FWS, “is the trans-
formational conservation challenge of our time, not only because of its 
direct effects, but also because of its influence on the other stressors 
that have been and will continue to be, major conservation 
priorities.”159 As biologist Young Choi emphatically sums up the 
challenge of climate change adaptation, “[w]e need to admit our 
inability to restore an ecosystem to its very original state. We cannot 
go back to our nostalgic past!”160 
Building adaptation strategies around historic baselines to 
resist climate change thus is a losing proposition.161 Miami, for 
example, might build seawalls, use pesticides to control invasive 
disease-bearing insects and parasites, import more sand, energy, and 
water to support its beach tourism industry, and establish health 
management systems to deal with increased disease. Even well before 
climate change became a concern, coastal communities in particular 
tenaciously clung to the status quo through such measures, so there is 
little reason to believe they will abandon the status quo willingly in 
the face of climate change.162 Similarly, the Preserve managers, whose 
mission has been to maintain a historic baseline, might work tirelessly 
 
sinks and sources such as fires and insect epidemics); Daniel B. Fagre et al., Thresholds of 
Change in Ecosystems 36–74 (draft, Aug. 14, 2008), available at http://www. 
climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-2/public-review-draft/sap4-2-prd.pdf (examining numerous 
positive feedback properties leading to nonlinear thresholds in climate change dynamics). 
 159. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: STRATEGIC PLAN FOR 
RESPONDING TO ACCELERATING CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (draft, Sept. 21, 2009). 
 160. Yong D. Choi, Restoration Ecology to the Future: A Call for New Paradigm, 15 
RESTORATION ECOLOGY 351, 351 (2007). 
 161. For an extensive discussion in the context of species conservation, see Alejandro E. 
Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource Law Under Climate 
Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 225–43 (2010). Camacho concludes that “the goal of preserving 
or restoring resources to a historic baseline that currently dominates natural resource policy will 
be increasingly difficult if not impossible to sustain.” Id. at 244. 
 162. For example, beach renourishment projects, while not generally motivated today by 
climate change concerns, are representative of the property disputes likely to arise as 
communities take measures to enhance coastal technological and natural resources to defend 
against sea level rise and more frequent and more intense storm surges. See Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597–600 (2010) (describing 
such a dispute). The case arose out of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Walton County v. 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008), in which the court found a state 
beach renourishment statute that fixed property boundaries for littoral property owners did not 
constitute a taking of property without just compensation. Id. at 2600. For an in-depth 
discussion of the case, see Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries and SOBs, 25 J. LAND USE 
& ENVTL. L. 19, 45–51 (2009). 
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to import water, soils, and other resources to prop up wetlands and 
corals diminished from climate change. They may intervene to prevent 
species from moving into or out of Biscayne Bay in response to climate 
change. But in neither case are these strategies likely to work in the 
long run. For Miami and the Preserve, the cost of maintaining the 
status quo with no margin of deviation is likely to become prohibitive 
at the very least, and infeasible in many respects. Sticking rigidly to 
historic baselines could become counterproductive to other policy goals 
in those circumstances. On a macro regional or national scale, 
moreover, the “resist” strategy cannot be uniformly maintained—to 
the extent managing numerous areas such as Miami and the Preserve 
for the status quo depends on importing water, energy, or other 
resources from somewhere else, then obviously not every human and 
natural environment can be managed for the status quo. 
The transformative effects climate change will have on 
conceptions of variability and change in human and natural 
environments thus undermines the very premise of resist strategies. If 
status quo were nonetheless the expressed goal of an adaptation policy 
for places like Miami and the Preserve, the use of historic baselines 
would have to place primary design emphasis on the margin of 
deviation, which would need to accommodate significant departures 
from the temporal reference point conditions. It would be as if the “no 
net loss” policy had been framed as the “lots of net loss” policy, at 
which point the adaptation goal looks less like resisting to maintain 
the status quo and more like transforming to deal with change. Resist 
strategies and their historic baselines, in other words, will be 
swamped by climate change into a focus on how far off the status quo 
conditions have moved. 
Given that resist strategies in areas such as Miami and 
Biscayne Bay are likely to devolve into “transform” strategies, historic 
baselines seem particularly inappropriate. Transform strategies 
assume that maintaining the status quo or restoring conditions to a 
past state are either not feasible or not desirable policy goals. A 
standard like “no net loss” or “pre-European conditions” has little 
meaning in that context. Rather, transform strategies assume that 
transition and change are integral parts of the program and set goals 
for the future, irrespective of the past. Is a historic baseline approach 
even possible when climate change has obliterated the baseline? 
Miami’s city managers, for example, may hope to replace beach 
tourism with some other form of tourism, and the Preserve’s managers 
may decide to replace species-specific goals with goals such as 
conserving an overall mix of biodiversity without regard to species 
assemblage. What passes as “natural conditions,” in other words, is no 
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longer referenced from the past but rather from the anticipated 
future. Historic baselines, though, could be designed around such 
policies. For example, a rolling baseline could be used to measure 
average changes in tourism categories or species categories. But in 
that context the historic baseline is simply a “soft” regulatory 
instrument, a measurement tool used to test implementation 
techniques, not a “hard” regulatory tool used to establish and enforce 
implementation goals. It is far more likely that standards based on 
risk, technological feasibility, and cost will drive policy decisions in a 
dynamic environment with only partially informed conceptions of 
what the world is supposed to look like on the “other side” of climate 
change, other than it will not look anything like the past. 
An even more compelling case can be made against using 
historic baselines in support of move strategies for climate change 
adaptation. If people decide to leave Miami or other areas, or if 
resource managers decide to engage actively in assisted migration of 
species, that reflects a decision that the status quo or restoration to a 
past set of conditions are not feasible goals and that transformation 
with change in situ is not viable either.163 History and the status quo 
are at that point irrelevant policy tools. Even using historic baselines 
to guide carrying capacity decisions—for example, to establish how 
many people or species members can move out of an area or into an 
area—is not useful when the carrying capacities also are changing due 
to climate change. Using historic baselines in these adaptation 
settings could prove foolish if not dangerous. 
C. Going Forward 
Our examination of historic baselines in climate change policy 
thus suggests that (1) mitigation and adaptation polices are distinct 
and must be designed with their respective attributes in mind, and (2) 
historic baselines provide a very good match with the attributes of 
mitigation policy, but not with those of adaptation policy. Put another 
way, even though people often speak of mitigation and adaptation as 
two sides of the same coin, they are actually very different, even to the 
level of goal structure, and we need to be careful not to let the facility 
of baselines in mitigation shift over to adaptation without recognizing 
these fundamental differences. Historic baselines are directly 
implicated in only one side of the climate debate. For climate 
 
 163. See Camacho, supra note 161, at 223 (“Assisted migration directly contradicts this focal 
management goal of preserving or restoring natural resources to a static historic baseline.”). 
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mitigation, they are unavoidable, and that is probably a good thing. 
For adaptation policies, by contrast, they are maladapted. 
Our concern is that, notwithstanding these limitations of 
historic baselines in support of resist, transform, and move strategies 
for climate change adaptation, historic baselines will prove irresistible 
to policymakers designing adaptation standards. The gaming success 
historic baselines have had thus far in mitigation policy could delude 
policymakers into believing that they can also finesse adaptation 
policies from historic baselines. Adaptation policy, moreover, is 
directly about the kind of change people fear, making explicit 
discussion of risk, technology, and cost less palatable for politicians. 
Just as with “no net loss,” historic baselines could be attractive to 
policymakers as a means of masking and deferring the tough policy 
decisions on risk, technology, and cost. As the “no net loss” experience 
has shown, however, unless carefully designed and monitored, gaming 
can creep in to make performance measurement less reliable and thus 
distort long-term assessment of the standard’s performance. As 
difficult as it has been thus far to assess whether “no net loss” has 
been a successful wetlands conservation standard, imagine how 
difficult it will be to evaluate after fifty years of accelerated climate 
change whether “natural” wetland conditions around the nation have 
fundamentally changed.164 Policymakers therefore should resist the 
temptation to assume that the facility of historic baselines in 
mitigation policy can be imported to adaptation policy, and should 
instead build adaptation policy on explicit risk, technology, and cost 
standards. 
CONCLUSION 
Every method of standard setting in regulatory policy leverages 
its own unique attribute. An extensive scholarship explores how risk-
based standards use risk analysis; how absolute standards use hard 
quantification; how technology-based standards use engineering 
knowledge; and how cost-based standards use economic cost-benefit 
analysis. By contrast, there has been virtually no consideration of how 
 
 164. Some researchers believe that, while wetland conditions at any one location are likely to 
degrade or improve with climate change, overall the United States will experience no net loss 
and perhaps even some gain of wetland resources as a result of climate change. See Matthew L. 
Kirwan et al., Latitudinal Trends in Spartina Alterniflora Productivity and the Response of 
Coastal Marshes to Global Climate Change, 15 GLOBAL CLIMATE BIOLOGY 1982, 1986–87 (2009) 
(climate change may increase total productivity and ecosystem services of coastal wetlands). This 
assumes, of course, that areas likely to transition into new or expanded wetlands are not 
converted to some other land use before then. 
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historic baselines operate—a serious gap given the widespread use of 
historic baselines by Congress and agencies. 
To fill that gap, this Article has explored in detail the 
attributes and operation of historic baselines. That historic baselines 
are found throughout regulatory law is no accident. Particularly when 
the policy goal involves turning back the clock or halting an 
undesirable trend, historic baselines have distinct advantages 
compared to alternative techniques for standard setting. These 
advantages include rhetoric, familiarity, and flexibility. The use of the 
temporal reference point lies at the heart of what makes historic 
baselines distinct in this respect, yet it is also what makes them 
qualitatively different for purposes of gaming. Leveraging the past 
provides an additional dimension to the gaming potential found in 
other techniques, such as technology- or cost-based goals. 
This very attraction, however, equally limits historic baselines 
in some contexts. This limitation is most evident in climate change 
adaptation policy, where baselines simply do not easily fit because the 
policy goal is fundamentally about resetting the clock, not turning it 
back. There is no past to leverage when it comes to climate change 
adaptation. This may be true in other cases where massively 
transformative forces are at work, such as with the global financial 
crisis. Going back to the past may be appealing in these settings, but 
it is ultimately infeasible. Policymakers reaching for a more forward-
looking policy thus should eye warily the appeal to the past embedded 
in historic baselines. 
 
